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Between Nationalism and Religion in Egypt: 
 Imagining the Nation from Below  
 
 
Introduction 
 
The January 25 revolution and the dramatic unfolding of events thereafter, have been a 
time of immense social, political and economic transformation in Egypt. Recent changes in 
political leadership, from the fall of Mubarak’s regime, to the Muslim Brotherhood’s (MB) 
ascent to power, and finally, to the landslide victory of the Armed Forces through Abdel Fattah 
el-Sisi’s assuming of the presidency, have brought to light some of the dynamics of mass politics 
in Egypt.  These transformations made visible a wide array of expressions of collective and 
national belonging as the Egyptian people came into contact with ideologically differentiated 
ruling regimes. The Muslim Brotherhood became synonymous with Islamic rule and an Islamic 
state in Egypt. The Armed Forces on the other hand, presented themselves as the true and 
ultimate bearer of Egyptian nationalism. What these uncomplicated identifications miss, 
however, are the intermediate and transformative positionalities between the two spheres of 
religion and nationalism, as subjectively experienced by citizens. Therefore, the aim of this work 
is to explore and unpack citizens’ own constructions of nationhood and national belonging 
during the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule and their quick fall from power; a time when Islamists 
were seemingly gaining a historical grip on Egyptian politics and society. The construction of 
2 
 
national sentiments during this transformative period is explored through the experiences of 
residents of one of Cairo’s working class neighborhoods; ‘Ain el-Sira.  
Nationalism and State Practices 
 
This work aims to explore nationalism as a socially constructed and transformative force; one 
that has been most aggressively shaped through local discourses of modernization and anti-
colonialism. The shaping of Egyptian nationalism through anti-colonial struggles has brought 
novel power structures and power relations to the newly independent nation-state. That is, in one 
way, nationalism has served to legitimate the emergence of new elite groups that have the 
capacity to undermine colonial authority and place power into the hands of nationals.  
Nationalism also served to legitimate the emergence of a new power structure, whereby power 
became a relationship between the national elite and citizens with whom they are believed to 
share a common destiny, identity and culture. Nationalism in this case, is not only implicated in 
claims about collective identity, but it also makes claims about power, where the latter is 
promised to be brought back into the hands of the people or nation, the elite and citizens alike.  
As such, it is possible to situate power relations within the discourse and related practices of 
nationalism, as essentially premised on the promise of equality among all members of the nation, 
as well as emphasizing a shared stake in the national project. But beyond this abstract notion of 
equality and shared stakes, lay the realities of inequality and the continuous struggle to realize 
the promises of national inclusion; a struggle which takes place through a multiplicity of 
platforms.  
One of those platforms, is found at the level of state practices, through the bodies and institutions 
of the state with which citizens regularly engage. That is, the meaning of nationalism becomes 
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socially constructed in the struggle for power distribution between the ruling elite and citizens, as 
played out at the level of state practices.  This study sees in the spaces of everyday practices with 
and around the authority of the state, generative sites for popular negotiations of the values of 
equality and inclusion and belonging. As such, this work engages Egyptian nationalism from two 
broad, yet intertwined angles. First, citizens’ everyday interactions with bureaucratic bodies and 
institutions of the state are understood to be fertile grounds for creating conceptions of, and 
relations with, the governing regime and the contours of the national unity it propagates. 
Secondly, nationalism, as a political project and personal sentiment, is read through its position 
within a society in which religion strongly contributes to the shaping of collective identities, yet 
one which has seemingly rejected Islamic rule. This is most vividly seen through the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s victory in the parliamentary and presidential elections of 2011-2012, and their 
quick downfall as seen through popular support given to the Army in removing the Islamic group 
from power. 
It is from these two angles that the formation of national identity is analyzed among the residents 
of ‘Ain el-Sira. This exploration of nationalism is thus, a spatially specific one and not 
synonymous with the attitudes and experiences of an entire population. Additionally, the 
experiences analyzed here are not representative of the entire community, but rather of particular 
economic and social groups within it, as will be seen in more detail in the coming chapters. The 
history of the locale, the social relationships it harbors and the relations its residents have 
fostered with state authorities over the decades are critical to understanding residents’ 
formulations of modes of belonging and national identity during the past few years.   
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Division of Chapters  
 
To better situate the above mentioned points, Chapter two focuses on macro-level analyses of 
Egyptian nationalist discourse as it has developed through its modern history. Specifically, it 
focuses on the different ideological, territorial and religious references along which nationalist 
discourse was propagated by different leaders through Egypt’s modern history, while pointing to 
some of the continuities that have survived till the present day. The point of this over-view is to 
offer a framework for observing the development of the conceptual and moral limits of Egyptian 
nationalism as made available through macro-level discourses of nationalism. Such an analysis 
sets the stage for a more contextualized analysis of citizens’ own constructions of national 
belonging. In addition, the chapter critiques the polarity of religion and nationalism through 
bringing into view some of the ways in which the two have been congruently constructed. 
Beginning with Egypt’s “liberal” period under British colonial rule and ending with the fall of 
Mubarak’s regime, the chapter demonstrates how the influence of political ideologies adopted by 
the state, have diminished over this period. This loss in ideational resonance, however, does not 
imply a weakened impetus of the nation, for nationalist sentiments congruently came to espouse 
and express a powerful kind of territorial nationalism, as opposed to an ideological one. As will 
be shown the place and role of the Egyptian army is significant in this regard, mainly as it is the 
sole institution responsible for the protection of the national territory. More so, ruling regimes 
have repeatedly utilized the resonance and popularity of the national army in garnering support 
for their legitimacy, as the army is considered the institution most capable of upholding Egyptian 
sovereignty and independence. The powerful emotional capital garnered by the Egyptian army 
attests to both the centrality of the territorial dimension of Egyptian nationalism, as well as a 
popular recognition of the army as an intrinsically nationalist force.  
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More so, the void left by incoherent governing political ideologies, has reformulated spaces of 
engagement with the state, whereby relations with the ruling regime are fostered through more 
personal and less ideational links with the latter. The growth of state institutions and bureaucratic 
bodies and the development of powerful interest groups and power relations within them have 
shifted forms of recognition and inclusion within the nationalist project. That is, the power 
relations inherent in these personalized (and often informal) relations are constitutive of 
processes through which the values of equality and national inclusion among citizens, became 
shaped and understood. Feelings of exclusion and neglect by the state have proven to be 
powerful in mobilizing social and political groups against national rulers and in awakening a 
sense of powerful nationalism against what was framed as ‘unpatriotic’ rule.  
Moving towards a micro-view analysis regarding everyday popular constructions of national 
belonging, chapter three will thus explore the socio-economic and political landscape in ‘Ain el-
Sira. Understanding the specific urban history of the neighborhood, the socio-economic 
transformations taking place within it, and its place within national development plans allows for 
a more developed and spatially specific analysis of residents’ experiences and reactions to the 
recent changes in ruling regimes, specifically the coming of the Muslim Brotherhood. As will be 
seen, an understanding of popular attitudes against the Muslim Brotherhood is best developed 
through realizing the centrality of the personalized relations of power inherent in the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s governing structures. More so, the latter’s collision with already-existing local 
power structures in ‘Ain el-Sira, further impeded the Brotherhood’s capacity for garnering 
political and social legitimacy, struggling at arousing a sense of nationalist belonging among 
large groups of citizens 
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The powerful forces of nationalism which manifested during the events of the January 25 
Revolution against Mubarak’s regime, attest to the ways in which disenchantment over the kinds 
of power relations operating in governing bodies and institutions have mobilized millions 
towards a desire to “retrieve” their nation from a corrupt elite. Similarly so, popular reactions 
against the Muslim Brotherhood have been part of a nationalist upheaval against attempts of 
monopolizing power by the Islamic group, as became apparent through residents’ anecdotes of 
the exclusionary practices of some bodies of the state operating in ‘Ain el-Sira at the time. Thus, 
relations between the ruling regime and citizenry is the focus of chapter four. As practices of 
ideological engagement with the state lessen in force, it becomes pertinent to explore some of the 
alternative spaces that are constitutive of processes of national subject formation. Through 
discussions with ‘Ain el-Sira’s residents’ regarding their experiences with the tumultuous and 
transformative period following the Muslim Brotherhood’s victory in June 2012, the chapter 
focuses on residents’ everyday interactions with representatives of the new ruling elite and the 
ways in which impressions of the ruling Islamic regime were created and communicated. 
Residents’ initial hopes for better living conditions under the Islamic rule of the Muslim 
Brotherhood have helped position the latter as a legitimate contending national force, with high 
hopes for the betterment of national conditions. Nevertheless, throughout the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s year-long rule, spaces for developing sentiments of belonging, assimilation and 
inclusion in the national project had been impeded by what had been experienced as exclusionary 
practices and rhetoric, as seen in ‘Ain el-Sira. The focus thereby shifts to micro-scale interactions 
between residents and state personnel and government bodies. Attention to everyday realities of 
residents brings to light the centrality of the informal relations that had developed with bodies of 
the state over the previous decades. Opportunities for patronage, clientelism and middle-men 
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work, reveal spaces of affiliation with ruling regimes that fall outside the limits of an ideological 
subscription, yet those which have engineered discreet and informal spaces of inclusion within 
the national polity.  More so, the discursive spaces in which these lines of mutual benefit operate, 
are explored through the spatial and social politics within the neighborhood, whereby familiarity 
with the ways of the governing regime- its tactics, personnel and opportunities of engagement 
with it- appear essential in understanding modes of assimilation and recognition to nationalist 
regimes.  What I term, a ‘capacity for recognition’, is thus central in situating residents’ attitudes 
towards national leaders and in shaping a popular nationalist discourse. The opportunity for 
understanding the limits of ‘recognition’ are most vividly seen through the neighborhood’s 
experience with the Muslim brotherhood and their subsequent removal by the Egyptian Armed 
Forces. 
The final chapter focuses on the popular acclamation of the army as representative and upholder 
of an “authentic” Egyptian nationalism. The transformative power of the army is apparent 
through its removal of Mohamed Morsi and banning the Muslim brotherhood from the political 
sphere, and in many ways, the social sphere as well. The performance of the armed forces in that 
transformative period and its ability to mobilize mass support, allows one to read the position of 
the armed forces in Egyptian political and social life as a state institution that has managed to 
move beyond the sphere of political recognition, onto more naturalized spaces of national 
belonging. 
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Literature Review and Conceptual Framework 
 
In order to better contextualize the concepts and arguments mentioned above, this section aims to 
position them within the existing literature on nationalism, nation-building and national subject 
formation. The aim is to make clear the contours of the conceptual framework within which this 
study is situated through an engagement with selected works and authors. In doing so, it traces 
some of the transformations in theoretical approaches to nationalism, specifically highlighting 
the importance of research practices that focus on micro-scale, everyday processes of social life, 
as generative spaces for understanding collective action and popular constructions of the national 
imagery.  
Writings on nationalism that date back to Renan’s texts of the mid 1800s, argue for the existence 
of a “national spirit”1 as one of nationalism’s strongest and lasting powers. Nations for Renan 
were defined by a clearly expressed desire of a people to live together and “continue life in 
common” 2 with the role of intellectuals centered as the leaders and bastions of the national 
spirit. Renan’s work had in ways, set apart the ideas of race and nation, by incorporating an 
ethno-cultural sense of nationalism combined with the active commitment of members of the 
nation. However, early writings emanating from Europe, had accepted the equation of the idea of 
race with the concept of the nation, whereby nations became the basic communities of history; 
organic, ancient and immemorial.
3
 These “perennialist” perspectives on the nation, which 
regarded national sentiments and consciousness as fundamental features of historical 
phenomena, would soon be challenged by the tides of modernism and anti-colonial struggles. 
That is, the expansion of the impetus of nationalism outside of Europe and across the globe as 
                                                          
1
 Renan, Ernest. What Is a Nation?  Toronto: Tapir, 1996. Print. 
2
 Renan, cited in Kohen, 135-40. 
3
 Smith, Anthony. "The Rise of Classical Modernism." Nationalism and Modernism. Routledge, 1998, p. 19. 
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seen in central and Latin America, Eastern Europe, India, the Far East, as well as the Middle East 
and Africa, has rendered much criticism of the view of nationalism and nations as organic 
historical conjunctions. Specifically, the end of the Second World War which saw the rise of 
anti-colonial nationalisms, had problematized the homogeneity of nation building processes as 
seen through the rising tide of modernism.
4
 Instead of viewing nations as the product of deep 
rooted historical forces, modernists saw nations as products of recent historical developments as 
well as of deliberate, rational activity which was made possible and necessary by the coming of 
modernity.
5
 The emergence of the classical modernist school of thought at the turn of the 
twentieth century and its conceptual development with the rise of third-world nationalisms, has 
had a significant and lasting effect on contemporary works on nationalism and national 
belonging.  
The modernist approach constitutes a very wide literature and variations exist among the 
theorists who subscribe to this paradigm. Some of the strongest proponents of the modernist 
school of the 1950s and 1960s explain the construction of modern nationalism through the active 
work of political elites. That is, their active efforts in creating nationalist discourses, as well as 
acting as forces of social mobilization are seen as the most vital features of the modern nation-
building processes. Writers such as Ernest Gellner and Elie Kedourie are adherents to the 
modernist paradigm and stress the role of active participation, elite practices and social 
mobilization in the building of modern nations.
6
  
The work of Ernest Gellner is perhaps the most useful starting point for conceptualizing the 
contours of modern nationalism as discussed in this work. By mapping out some of Gellner’s 
                                                          
4
 Smith, 18. 
5
 Smith, 19 
6
 Smith, 24 
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concepts and critically situating them among contending writings, the scope and limits of his 
arguments are made visible to the study of contemporary third-world nationalisms, such as 
Egypt. Gellner’s modernist approach to nationalism is seen through his emphasis on the elite 
process of nation-building. The effects of uneven global modernization have resulted in massive 
moves from rural to urban areas, culminating in a growing public mass which looked towards 
language and culture rather than village and tribal structures for social organization
7
. More so, 
the onset of modern forms of governance has brought with it novel political and social structures 
which made possible the formation and recreation of a class of political elite. Those elite whose 
active efforts in tracing back an immemorial nationalist past and in cultivating a unifying 
nationalist discourse capable of steering the collective body of the nation into the promised 
future, made possible the wide-ranging fervor of nationalisms. Therefore, Gellner’s 
argumentation stems from the idea that nations do not simply create nationalisms, but rather that 
nationalist movements define, and create nations.
8
 According to Gellner,  
 Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-consciousness: it invents 
nations where they do not exist - but it does need some pre-existing differentiating 
marks to work on, even if…these are purely negative. 9 
Gellner’s focus on the contribution of a political elite in creating nations allowed him to view 
nationalism as a theory of political legitimacy.
10
 Leaders’ and political elites’ reliance on popular 
support that is garnered through the unifying discourse of nationalism is seen through the 
relegation of other loyalties (religion, race, ethnicity and class) to the nationalist calling. This 
                                                          
7
 Smith, 27 
8
 Gellner, Ernest. Thought and Change. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1965, 
 168. 
9
 Ibid 
10
 Smith, 29. 
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kind of political legitimacy is also based in the notion that ethnic boundaries within a state, 
should not separate the power holders from the rest.
11
 This latter contention will prove to be 
specifically important in reading popular attitudes from ‘Ain el-Sira towards the authority of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. It is not that the Muslim Brotherhood represented a different ethnicity, but 
that their political discourse had hinged on exclusionary references, as expressed by many of the 
residents. 
More so, for Gellner, securing this kind of political legitimacy was made possible through the 
role of mass public education systems, and their particular role in sustaining ‘high culture’.12 
High culture is understood to be the culture of the elite and the intelligentsia; one that is specially 
cultivated and education-based.
13
 High culture becomes the space where images of the nation are 
drawn up and national discourse constructed. However, Gellner did not necessarily see high 
culture as exclusively belonging to the elite minority but saw in the force of the public education 
systems an ability to create a new kind of public; one that hinged on sustaining the ‘high culture’ 
and a desire and need to secure the growth and place of the homeland. That is, even though in the 
revised edition to his earlier work, Gellner stresses the spaces available for popular constructions 
of the nation through mass education, he still views those as structurally positioned to benefit the 
interests of a dominant high culture.  
Although Gellner’s reading of nations and nationalisms duly brings into perspective the unequal 
effects of global modernization, highlighting the powerful role of the political elite in fostering 
nationalisms, I find that it contains a number of conceptual setbacks. First, Gellner’s take on the 
nation-building process is highly political. It affords little space for the work of cultural and 
                                                          
11
 Ibid 
12
 Ibid 
13
 Smith, 32 
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communal norms, practices and beliefs. His focus is on elite groups and structures, marking 
those outside the realm of high cultures as ‘wild’ creatures that have been unable to engender a 
nationalism.
14
 The oppositional nature of high and low culture masks the discursive spaces of 
meaning making and the fluidity and movement that takes place between the two. In doing so, it 
also downplays opportunities for agency and action among the masses. A need therefore arises to 
complicate the link between high culture and the force of nationalism. That is, to complicate the 
relation between the nation-state and the nation. Subsuming the nation within the concept of the 
nation-state precludes the consideration of the problematic of the nation as a community. A 
community that is imagined to exist among like-minded equals, and for whom its members are 
prepared to make real sacrifices
15
.  
Situating Cultural Nationalism 
 
Moving away from totally subjecting the nation to the nation state, writers such as Hutchinson 
and Anthony Smith have demonstrated the significance of a cultural approach to nationalism, as 
well as a need for reading nationalism in line with popular perspectives from below.
16
 
Hutchinson’s thought-provoking analysis of cultural nationalism shifts our gaze to the small 
scale, often transient character of nationalist expressions that stem from a need for moral 
regeneration of the community.
17
 More accurate is Hutchison’s assertion that cultural 
nationalism exists in a “contrapuntal relationship” with political nationalism.18 That is, when 
political nationalisms fail or become exhausted, the space for a cultural nationalism becomes 
clear in nationalists’ abilities to tap into collective energies, mobilizing large numbers of the 
                                                          
14
 Ibid 
15
 Smith, 75. 
16
 Smith, 96  
17
 Hutchinson, John, and Anthony Smith. Nationalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994, p.41. 
18
 Smith, 73. 
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population towards an assertion of the power of nationalism and the homogeneity of its national 
community. 
Understanding the position of cultural nationalism within national communities is central to the 
focus of this work. The weak impetus of political nationalism under Mubarak, had allowed for 
the recognition and acceptance of the Muslim Brotherhood as legitimate national leaders due to 
their representing Islamic moral and cultural grounds common to wide sections of the 
population. Nevertheless, maintaining a view of nationalism as a transformative and socially 
constructed force, these initial attitudes were soon overshadowed as residents experienced 
exclusionary practices from the bodies and representatives of the Islamic regime on the local 
level. Sentiments of exclusion and inequality between the ruling and the ruled are understood as 
signifying a rift in their imagined cultures of belonging; differentially implicating the moral and 
cultural capital which was associated with the Muslim Brotherhood with power struggles over 
inclusion and recognition. It must be noted that inclusion and recognition in this case do not refer 
to equality in terms of material or political power, but rather equality in being perceived as a 
member of the nation by the national leaders. The exclusion and inequality associated with the 
practices of the Muslim Brotherhood had to do with a certain mood of distinction among 
citizens; between those who belonged to the Muslim Brotherhood and those who did not, 
propagating an idea that some citizens were considered to be more incorporated into the 
nationalist project under the Brotherhood, than others.  The struggle over power on the level of 
state bodies and institutions thus make visible the modes of assimilation and belonging with 
national regimes and leaders. More so, expressions of a reawakened Egyptian nationalism 
following the removal of the Muslim Brotherhood - although clearly intertwined with political 
bias and rhetoric - seem to have emanated from the historical recognition of the army as a 
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nationalist group, untainted by the political and ideological power struggles of other political 
actors. The kind of nationalism garnered by the Army seemed to fall on more primordial 
registers of the nation; unraveling specific cultural understandings of nationhood and the 
homeland at a time of political crisis.  
Gellner’s political nationalism, reminds us of the views of Eric Hobsbawm, who, writing from a 
Marxist perspective in the 1980s, argued that the nature of the modern nation lies in its elite’s 
invention of national histories, symbols and lines of ancestry, where they did not previously 
exist. But Hobsbawm goes as far as concluding that nationalism has simply become irrelevant to 
most contemporary economic and social developments, a view which could not seem further 
from the truth in the present world order of nation states.
19
 Perhaps it is as Smith argues, that the 
adaptability of the discourse of nationalism has becomes an inherent quality of its survival, and 
that changes to the discourse must be situated on a wavelength to which the public is ready to 
tune into, further complicating Gellner’s polarized high and low cultures. 20  The ability to 
transform and sway populations, I argue, has been visibly pertinent with the take-over of the 
Egyptian Armed forces from the MB and the kind of cultural and nationalist discourse they 
utilized in validating the take-over. The changes which took place in the modes of reference of 
the nationalist discourse, are seen as discursively engaged with residents’ changing attitudes to 
the authority of the Muslim Brotherhood, as will be discussed in chapters 4 and 5. 
Nationalism and Bureaucracy 
 
Going beyond Gellner’s work thus warrants a conceptual shift. That is, instead of trying to define 
and pinpoint the place of emergence of national loyalty, it becomes more pertinent to understand 
                                                          
19
 Hobsbawm, Eric. Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality. Second edition ed. Cambridge 
University Press, 1990,175. 
20
 Smith, 130. 
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the ways in which communities relate to and conceptualize national authority. The work of John 
Breuilly has shed light on the important role of growing bureaucracies in creating modern 
nationalisms. He contends that one of the keys to success of modern nations is their creation of 
an infrastructure of social communication, of which the state bureaucracy is a main pillar.
21
 The 
case of Egyptian nationalism for instance, even though not created out of the vessel of the 
bureaucratic state initially, still attests to the idea that the growth of the bureaucratic body, had 
arguably boosted spaces for engagement with the new nation-state. This had been particularly 
obvious under Nasser, whereby the efforts of the bureaucratic bodies were presented as working 
towards the development of the nation and the national community. The power of the 
bureaucracy through later eras of governance in Egypt however, has been consistently affected 
by the needs of a growing population. The increasing density of operations within bureaucratic 
bodies had generated an increased need and greater possibilities for informality. These increasing 
informal relations with the state were taking place at the borders of the legal bureaucratic state; 
thus culminating into an intermediary discursive space of engagement between state and citizens, 
as will be seen in the coming chapters. More so, the place of the bureaucracy has been 
consistently linked to the work of the state, with much less focus on its formative role in forming 
nationalisms.
22
 It is this conceptual gap between citizens’ interactions with administrative state 
bodies and their formulation of nationalism, which is discussed in this work through a focus on 
the everyday lives of residents at a time of political instability.     
Locating National Discourse through Everyday Spaces 
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 Smith, 20. 
22
 Smith, 233. 
16 
 
Going beyond locating a particular place of emergence of nationalism warrants a 
conceptualization of the ways in which communities relate to one another and conceptualize 
relations among its members. This approach I argue, becomes critical to understanding the vigor 
of nationalism. The work of Benedict Anderson has been quite significant in this regard.  
Anderson’s work operates within a modernist school of thought in dealing with emerging 
nationalisms.
23
 The main impetus of his argument lies in the idea that nationalisms have 
managed to create “imagined communities” whereby citizens who have no direct relation to one 
another, are able to imagine bonds of fraternity and collectivity within a given national territory. 
Anderson argues that possibilities of these kinds of imagined communities were made available 
through the revolutionary force of capitalism, particularly print capitalism as seen through the 
circulation of books, newspapers and journals. 
24
  
The idea that this imagined world becomes visibly rooted in everyday life is one of the concepts 
I appropriate from Anderson’s work. Citizens come to experience public life through a process 
of ‘selective fictiveness’, allowing them to link potentially unrelated events, symbols, figures and 
imageries to one another. Additionally, Anderson’s focus on print culture as one of the ways in 
which nationalist discourse and ideology came to permeate and shape public life, has been a 
hallmark of his work. Although it is true that print capitalism has been part of processes of 
expanding discursive understandings of the nation onto growing social fields, it’s positioning as 
the primary factor in creating possibilities for “a new form of imagined community”, does not 
seem particularly relatable to the Egyptian case.
25
 The processes of development of print 
capitalism were associated with trends in vernacularizing, and hence secularizing, the language. 
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 Smith, 137. 
24
 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism. Verso, 2006. 
25
 Ibid 
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In the case of Egypt, as in many other parts of the Arab world, Classical Arabic continues to co-
exist with national vernaculars, such as Egyptian, Jordanian and Syrian vernaculars. A large part 
of the authority of Classical Arabic comes from it being the language of the most important texts 
of Islamic civilization, the most important of which is the Qur’an. And with such an authority, 
Classical Arabic continued as the language of official writing, print-media, education and 
administration in Egypt. More so, Classical Arabic is an essential constituent of Arab identity 
and Arab nationalism, one which is meant to stress an overriding of religious affinities, yet one 
which simultaneously safeguards a specific Muslim identity. In Egypt however, there is no 
community of native speakers of Classical Arabic and the Egyptian vernacular ‘ammiyya, is the 
most prominently used for oral exchanges, non-print media, poetry, plays, and more recently for 
novels and other published works. The popularity of the Egyptian vernacular however, continues 
to co-exist with a strong appreciation of Classical Arabic, as the language of the Qur’an, existing 
alongside ‘ammiyya in its own right. For example, as described by Nilofar Haeri in her research 
in Cairo, the vernacularization of the Qur’an remained out of the question for Egyptians. 
Contrasting the case of Egypt with other Muslim countries such as Iran and Turkey where the 
Qur’an was translated into Persian and Turkish, the vernacularizing process in Egypt had steered 
clear of authoritative religious texts, and Classical Arabic continued as a marker of a modern 
Arab and Muslim identity. Therefore, the ways in which Anderson’s thesis on the role of 
vernacularzing language in the creation of modern nations can be applied to the Muslim world, 
remains vague as there are both similarities and differences among different countries in the 
region.
26
 More so, this primary focus on print capitalism misses instances of conceptualizing the 
nation through other non-textual mediums, which unlike print, have the advantage of being 
                                                          
26
 Haeri, Nilofar, Sacred Language, Ordinary People: Dilemmas of Culture and Politics in Egypt. 1st Ed. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2003. Web.  
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experienced by literate and semi-literate groups of the population.
27
 The lens of daily interactions 
with the bureaucratic bodies and government representatives can be fruitful as alternative 
mediums of experiencing and negotiating national values and practices on the local level, away 
from an elite-view of nation building. 
The universalism of Anderson’s work sheds light on the need for location-specific and local 
studies. Lisa Pollard’s groundbreaking historical study of nation building in Egypt between 
Muhammad Ali’s rule and the 1919 revolution shifts the historical gaze to the place of the family 
as a category of analysis for Egyptian nationalism. Pollard’s focus is on the ways in which the 
national character was shaped through the modern nuclear family as citizens acquired new 
domestic behaviors. Looking into nineteenth and early twentieth century school text books, 
syllabi and teacher’s guides, Pollard is able to explore some of the new and modern spaces in 
which domestic relations- understood as constitutive of a greater national whole- became 
understood, practiced and learned.
28
 Pollard’s historical account expands the spaces available for 
reading the forms of development of anti-colonial nationalisms, away from the euro-centric 
biases which Anderson remains framed within. Yet, her work continues to be focused on elite 
productions and bourgeois discourses of the nation as family, excluding the vast majority of 
Egyptians.  
Ziad Fahmy’s work on the construction of the modern Egyptian nation through popular culture is 
an important addition in this regard. Exploring late nineteenth century popular spaces for 
discussing and debating national identity in Egypt, Fahmy’s work brings into view the powerful 
and emotive forces of everyday cultural and artistic venues which do not rely on print capitalism 
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 Fahmy, Ziad "Popularizing Egyptian Nationalism: Colloquial Culture and Media Capitalism, 1870-1919." Doctor of 
Philosophy University of Arizona, 2007, 39.  
28
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for consumption.
29
 Bringing in the semi-literate and illiterate urban masses into the historical 
narrative, the power of songs, satire, plays, comedic sketches and poetry are explored, offering a 
much needed reading of anti-colonial nationalism from below. The focus on micro-scale, day-to-
day interactions is a central focus of my work, as I find in everyday neighborhood interactions 
with bodies of the state and with national issues, spaces that make visible some of the more 
discreet forms that nationalist expressions and group loyalties often take.  
The power of everyday happenings, social interactions and daily engagements with the symbols 
and bodies of the nation-state is explicated in Michael Billig’s “Banal Nationalism”. Billig’s 
work is geared towards a reading of everyday nationalisms as experienced within established and 
“settled” nations. Therefore the premise of his work greatly differs from this one in that it aims to 
trace the banal consistency of nationalism, rather than to focus on its modes of transformation in 
less stable and democratic nations, such as Egypt. Billig’s work remains significant for it marks a 
shift in the focus of research from macro-view theorizing on nationalism to more empirical 
studies, exploring issues of representation and localized meaning-making.
30
  
The work of Asef Bayat on the growing centrality of the public street as a political space has 
shed light on the everyday spaces in which identity formation and modes and networks of 
belonging take shape in the changing societies of the Muslim and Arab world.
31
 One of Bayat’s 
critical points in describing the nature of the political street has been his emphasis on its 
harboring of social ‘non-movements’ who are able to impact significant social and political 
change. Rather than looking for movement organizations with leaders or ideologies, Bayat sees 
                                                          
29
 Fahmy, Ziad. Ordinary Egyptians: Creating the Modern Nation through Popular Culture. Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 2011. 
30
 Skey, Michael. "The National in Everyday Life: A Critical Engagement with Michael Billig's Thesis of Banal 
Nationalism." The Sociological Review 57.2, 2009. 
31
 Bayat, Asef. Life as Politics: How Ordinary People Change the Middle East. Stanford University Press, 2013. 
20 
 
the operation of non-movements through individuals’ practicing of an everyday art of presence.32 
That is, utilizing what is available to them and uncovering new spaces within which to make 
one-self heard, seen, felt and realized within the nation.
33
 Social non-movements are thus 
arguably found to be more concerned with practice and action, rather than being ideologically 
driven.
34
 Bayat’s concept of social non-movements is critical in understanding the social, 
economic and political dynamics of the public street in ‘Ain el-Sira and the multiple relations 
between state and non-state actors that are established within it. The public street in the 
neighborhood thus becomes an “indispensable asset” for residents to survive and reproduce 
life.
35
 These everyday dynamics become more complicated with the notion that poor/ subaltern 
actors operate within an economy of power relations, with their practices effected by global 
economic policies and a declining welfare state.
36
 This idea is most heavily discussed in this 
work through the lens of neo-liberalism and the effect it has had on shaping market relations, 
urban localities, social engagements and political and economic aspirations in poor urban Cairo.  
Neo-liberalism and the Growth of Alternative Spaces for Identifying the Nation  
 
Neo-liberal cities are evidenced by increased de-regulation and privatization of production.
37
 
This thesis argues that the trend toward liberalization, has not only impacted trade behavior and 
economic relations, but also modes of engagement with a wide array of state and non-state 
actors. That is, it is through the proliferation of certain informal and de-centralized modes of 
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governance that neo-liberalism spreads its techniques and rationalities into social relations.
38
 The 
growing capacity for de-regulation and informality which characterizes the neo-liberal city is 
discussed in chapter four through the work of writers such as Asef Bayat and Salwa Ismail who 
focus on neo-liberal governmentality as generative of particular political civilities. Ismail’s focus 
has been on the various modes of intermediacy and clientelism that inform Egyptian social and 
political life. Her work reveals ways in which the operation of informants, thugs and mediators 
among citizens cuts across state and public officials’ concern with de-regulated capitalist 
accumulation.
39
 This work locates the impetus of neo-liberal governmentality through its 
decentralized power relations and informal networks of interest, and views them as constitutive 
of spaces for citizens to be positioned as intermediate power actors which have a stake in the 
national project. Even though assimilation with the national regime remained outside the realms 
of ideology, possibilities for citizens’ economic, political and social engagements with the bodies 
of the state, have allowed for differentiated modes of inclusion in the national project. 
Particularly ones that directly affected their day-to-day livelihood and survival. It is this 
discursive struggle around recognition and inclusion in interest groups of the national polity 
which have been powerful in mobilizing groups of the population against ruling regimes. 
Research in ‘Ain el-Sira reveals informal engagements with the bodies of the state, as entailing 
possibilities for not only economic, but also cultural and symbolic capital accumulation 
necessary for residents’ survival in the neighborhood. The power relations negotiated between 
bodies of the state and residents of the locale are central to understanding popular 
conceptualizations of national belonging in the neighborhood.  
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Positioning Religion in the Study of Nationalism  
 
Throughout its history, Egyptian nationalist discourse has always made space for Islam as an 
element of Egyptian identity, albeit to varying degrees and in different forms. More importantly, 
Islam in Egypt has come to infiltrate the day-to-day normalities (and abnormalities) of social and 
economic life. The work of Carry Wickham and Denis Sullivan helps in mapping out some of 
the ways in which Islam has become normalized in everyday life in Egypt, particularly through 
the proliferation of Islamic associations. These associations include religious charities, social 
services associations, and Islamic banks and multinationals, which have started appearing more 
broadly during the 1970s and which adhere to an Islamic character.  However, the extent to 
which Islam governs and guides the ways citizens perceive social and political life needs to be 
problematized in light of the recent transformations in Egyptian authority, particularly the 
celebration of the Army’s removal of the Muslim brotherhood. Writers such as Hania Sholkamy 
have consistently argued against the futile divide between secular liberalism and revivalist piety 
in understanding Egyptian political and social life arguing that most social actors hold something 
of both. Instead, the emphasis turns to examining the significance of motivations-be them 
religious, non-religious or something of both- to the meaning of the act itself.
40
 This kind of 
examination is followed through the course of this study as it examines residents’ attitudes and 
acts towards the authority of the Muslim Brotherhood, on both the local and national levels 
through historically contextualizing those with attitudes towards Mubarak’s NDP and the 
promises the army is imagined to bring. The significance of religion among residents, as will be 
seen, varies as religious repertoire becomes more aggressively engaged with political and social 
authority in the decision making ranks of the state. The space of religious loyalty as such, must 
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be read along the lines of economic, symbolic and social dispositions that are specifically 
experienced in the locale.  
The work of Roger Brubaker is highly informative in this regard. Following Brubaker’s four 
proposed methods of studying religion in national contexts, this work situates religion and 
nationalism in a transformative discursive relation with one another. That is, it presumes a fluid 
relationship which changes in nature depending on the spatial and temporal conditions of the 
country. I adopt from Brubaker the processes in which religion and nationalism are seen as 
analogous phenomena, whereby both act as basic sources and practices of social and cultural 
identification at times.
41
 Religion is also viewed as a category of ideational belonging that helps 
explain nationalism. I argue that this kind of religious aspect of national recognition has been 
specifically powerful with the Egyptian army, for instance seen in the emphasis of the national 
collective memory on the Prophet’s hadith which calls for upholding Egyptian soldiers in highest 
esteem. Brubaker’s other two approaches which see religion and nationalism as inherently 
intertwined with one another and that which sees a distinctively religious form of nationalism are 
also engaged in the text. Their limits become constructed against the practices and voices 
captured from the neighborhood. 
Methodology  
 
This work locates the processes of national belonging and identity formation in the spaces of 
meaning making found in everyday interactions between bodies of the state and members of its 
community, as they constitute discursive power spaces through which citizens come to interpret 
and experience the values of national equality, inclusion in the system and the lines along which 
they are constructed. The aim is thus to capture the motivations and limits to residents’ acts and 
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expressions of national loyalty. The aim is also to capture the registers (material, communal, 
religious or moral) that they fall onto. More so, this research is concerned with instances of 
transformation in residents’ feelings towards the different ruling regimes, in light of the socio-
political and economic contexts in which they occur. These transformations become visible 
through the physical and spatial developments in the locale, as well as through changes in 
residents’ attitudes and motivations towards the ruling authority. As such, data for this research 
is collected through engaging in participant observation over the course of six months. It also 
depends on conducting numerous semi-structured and unstructured interviews with residents of 
the neighborhood.  
One of the ways in which I managed to develop relationships with some of the residents of ‘Ain 
el Sira, was through prior personal knowledge of many members of Al Geel Center, until 
recently the only local NGO and research center in the neighborhood. At first, I spent a lot of 
time in Al Geel, getting to know some of the families and children that frequent it as well as 
helping out with the organization of events, or simply with managing small day-to-day errands. 
Spending time at the center also meant that I increasingly came in contact with locals who, 
although they do not partake in the activities of Al Geel, are in close contact with its members. 
Those include the adjacent coffee shop workers who are responsible for providing drinks 
(mashareeb) to visitors. Also included are the car workshops whose workers are often 
responsible for fixing and heavy lifting works in the center. After establishing my presence as a 
familiar visitor to the area, I found it easier to venture out into public spaces, spending more time 
in coffee shops and the small stores scattered along the streets, as residents became more familiar 
with my presence. That is, being acquainted with the center allowed me a trusted entry point to 
other spaces in the neighborhood, especially as some of the residents as I spoke with have long-
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standing personal ties of trust and familiarity with my main informants, Reda and Omar, from 
the center. 
My positionality as an outsider from the field, at first appeared strong, marked by an obvious 
class difference and a markedly distinct appearance as a non-veiled young women amidst the 
conservative setting of ‘Ain el-Sira. However, growing up visiting ‘Ain el Sira on a weekly 
basis, particularly Al Geel, having met and learnt from the late Ahmed Abdallah Rozza, founder 
of the center and ‘son’ of the neighborhood, as well as having developed relationships of 
familiarity with many of its members, all played a role in shaping my positionality as both an 
outsider, yet one with an old affiliation and specific interest in the place and its people. In fact, I 
find that this complication of my positionality in the spaces between outsider and local, helped in 
creating generative spaces for knowledge sharing between myself and residents. They too, 
became interested in understanding my “in-between” position as a young woman who does not 
live in ‘Ain el-Sira, yet one who has relationships in the neighborhood and continues to take an 
interest in its people and places. This had in fact prompted the curiosity of many of the residents 
I spoke to as they themselves were interested in exploring this intersection, asking questions like 
who I used to know and what I used to do in the neighborhood, to try and place the range of my 
local knowledge and research intentions. Realizing the processes in which one becomes “placed” 
by respondents, is essential in acknowledging that our subjective positionalities, become part of 
the field as we study it.  
Therefore, building rapport with many residents appeared to hinge on two main elements. First, 
were the instances where both of us appeared to share common knowledge about moments in the 
history of the neighborhood, some of the changes it has witnessed, or even news regarding the 
whereabouts of some of the old residents. Exchanging our own versions of local knowledge not 
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only allowed for an understanding of my own conceptual and observational limits, but it also 
gave many respondents the chance to venture into my own subjective history and experiences in 
the neighborhood. The nature of such interactions allowed for more personal and less inhibited 
conversation, situating our discussions as more personal endeavors rather than a process of 
simply providing information to an outside researcher. The other decisive element was residents’ 
subjective reactions to the topic of my research and my institutional affiliation. A few 
respondents expressed their disinclination towards discussing matters that they perceived as too 
“political” and “complicated”. Rather than directly expressing their apprehension, they mostly 
argued that they “do not engage in politics” (malhomsh fel seyasa), claiming lack of knowledge 
or expertise. It is important to point out that residents’ distrust and aversion to engaging in these 
kinds of discussions comes at a time in Egyptian politics, particularly following the events of 
January 25, when journalists, researchers and even photographers, have become increasingly 
framed as spies, instigators or essentially following a hidden, often dangerous agenda, and as 
such are quickly avoided by many. 
Another challenge faced in collecting data, was to find a way to address issues of national 
belonging with residents, from the bottom-up. That is, to allow for a space where popular 
references of national belonging could become expressed. This is in contrast to limiting 
discussions to the romanticized metanarratives of nationalism and national unity. Focusing on 
residents’ individual stories and experiences in their neighborhood, allowed for an expansion of 
these spaces, particularly as discussions about their experiences with the rule of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, revealed alternative everyday registers on which belonging to the nation is 
understood and negotiated.    
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Several semi-structured and unstructured interviews were conducted with two groups of 
residents; those who used to live in the neighborhood but have opted to move elsewhere, yet 
continue to have relations within the neighborhood. The second consists of residents who have 
been born and raised in ‘Ain el-Sira and continue to reside there. Discussions with former and 
older residents have been useful in providing a sort of oral history for the neighborhood, helping 
in allocating the most prominent aspects of change or discontinuity over the years. Interviews 
with current residents on the other hand, have been fruitful in capturing current power relations 
in the neighborhood, as concerning the role of community leaders and big families as they 
engage and react to the politics of the locale. More so, residents’ daily interactions with bodies of 
the state such as the police station, local municipality as well as interactions with members from 
the ruling authority such as the old NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood, reveal discursive spaces 
through which the national imagery becomes constructed. These interactions also reveal some of 
the registers along which the politics of national belonging become understood in a working 
class neighborhood in Cairo.  
Most of the data for this research had been collected through spending time in a number of 
locations in the neighborhood. This included the living quarters of some residents whom I have 
developed more personal relationships with, but most of my observations took place in the public 
space. This included car repair workshops which infiltrate the streets, the ‘ahawi (coffee shops) 
that have lately increased in number and Al Geel youth center.   
Conclusion 
This chapter has traced the main concepts and analytical strands that are utilized in this work. It 
has also critically engaged theoretical scholarship on nationalism, situating the macro narratives 
of nationalism against much needed micro deconstructionist approaches. Taking into account the 
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historical, political and social conditions through which the project of nation building unfolded in 
Egypt, this chapter introduced some of the ways in which modes of national belonging, feelings 
of inclusion by, and recognition of, national leaders and regimes are implicated in everyday 
power struggles and relations, taking place in the bodies and institutions of the state. The next 
chapter will focus on the historical development of Egyptian nationalist discourse from Egypt’s 
first encounter with liberal thought, up until the fall of the Mubarak regime in 2011 in order to 
point out some of the trends and continuities in the construction of Egyptian nationalist 
discourse, particularly in asserting its mobilizing power.  
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Egyptian Nationalism between Religion, the Military 
and Political ideology 
 
This chapter aims to trace the trajectory along which Egyptian nationalism developed 
throughout its modern history as well as the modes through which its contemporary image has 
been constructed. The point is to offer a macro-view analysis of the political, territorial and 
religious references along which Egyptian nationalism was constructed by different regimes, 
while pointing to some of the continuities that have survived till the present day. Distinguishing 
patterns of political, cultural and religious nuances inherent in the official nationalist discourse, 
allows for a better understanding of local trends and collective community behavior towards the 
Muslim Brotherhood. This next analysis therefore provides historical structure to the processes 
of everyday local interactions with representatives of the ruling regimes. 
 
 Since independence in 1952, Egyptian presidents have continuously belonged to the 
institution of the army, even though the nature of each ruler’s relationship to the armed forces 
has varied. With the Muslim Brotherhood’s rise to power in 2012, national leadership was not 
only accorded to a movement whose loyalties had been created outside the national military 
institution, but one which also represented an ideologically and politically independent 
organization. By focusing on elite discourses of nationalism, the purpose of this chapter is to 
outline three constitutive elements of Egyptian nationalist discourse and the ways Egypt’s 
experience with Islamic rule can be read against them. First, the development of Egyptian 
nationalism is read through the emotive and powerful role played by the Egyptian army, 
particularly seen through a heightened sense of territorial nationalism. The formation of 
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nationalist discourse is also analyzed through the role played by political ideologies, particularly 
focusing on the conditions necessary for these ideologies to be able to mobilize public support. 
Finally, nationalist discourse is seen through its articulation with the values of religion and piety 
as normalized aspects of everyday life. Rather than reading these aspects separately or 
independently of one another, these forces are seen as intertwined with one another, 
simultaneously affecting the ways in which the “nation” is identified and constructed by different 
rulers. This analysis is also fruitful in understanding popular opposition against the ideological 
project of the Muslim Brotherhood, culminating in nationalist demands for the take-over of the 
Egyptian army in mid 2013. That is, through reading the development of Egyptian nationalism 
along these lines, it becomes possible to view Egypt’s recent experience with Islamic rule apart 
from the long-standing debate around religion versus nationalism. But rather as a dialectic 
moment in which the forces of everyday religiosity and popular and historical renditions of 
nationalism, resulted in a collective reconstruction of the conceptual limits of national 
community. A reconceptualization which resulted in the rejection of national rule under the 
Islamic project of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Beginning with Egypt’s early encounter with the 
ideological project of liberalism, through Nasser’s socialism and the Muslim Brotherhood’s 
Islamism, the following sections point out trends in the construction of the limits of national 
community within elite discourse. Understanding these trends is helpful in better situating the 
discussion on popular attitudes towards the nationalist narrative adopted by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, as experienced in ‘Ain el Sira.  
Situating Muhammad Ali’s Modern State through the lens of Popular Egyptian Nationalism 
 
Although it is true that the formation of the modern Egyptian state begins with the rule of 
Muhammed Ali, this chapter focuses more closely on the genesis of popular nationalist 
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movements beginning in early modern Egyptian history with Mustapha Kamil and Sa’d Zaghlul. 
However, it is necessary to point out that the policies and practices of Muhammed Ali’s 
government and military had set in motion sentiments of a heightened territorial nationalism, 
backed by a central and decisive role of the Egyptian military, one which has arguably continued 
till the present day. The transformation of these sentiments into collective expressions of a 
patriotic territorialism both as transformations from within the military and among the general 
population began to take place in the early decades of the twentieth century as Egyptians and 
Egyptian nationalist discourse became increasingly shaped by the drive for independence against 
British occupation. Therefore, in an attempt to discern the distinct features of early popular 
nationalist movements and to understand some of their lasting influences, we need to first 
dedicate some time to understanding the political context in which these movements appeared, 
understanding them through earlier state-building projects as under Muhammed Ali. 
Modernizing the State under Muhammed Ali 
   The formation of the modern Egyptian state is coined with the rule and military expansions led 
by Albanian soldier Muhammed Ali in the early 1800s. The longest reigning Ottoman vali in 
Egypt, Muhammed Ali’s efforts included the centralization of administrative and political 
control and fighting bureaucratic corruption on the local level.
42
 He also cancelled the 
immunities on agricultural land belonging to religious institutions (awqaf) and increased the 
production of long staple cotton, thus funneling massive revenue to Cairo and into the Pasha’s 
coffers.
43
  Most importantly however, has been Muhammed Ali’s influence on the modernizing 
of the Egyptian military. Anxious to secure his position against the central Ottoman authority in 
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Istanbul, Muhammad Ali adopted the practice of conscription in 1820-1821 and his army 
eventually amassed to an impressive thirteen thousand troops, in addition to a modernizing state 
and a growing bureaucracy
44
 Conscripting the army’s soldiers’ from the Egyptian peasantry, 
Muhammed Ali aimed at molding the new troops into a modern, European-style fighting force.
45
  
However, Khaled Fahmy’s historical analysis of Muhammed Ali’s military modernization 
practices describes the novel practices of disciplinary power introduced through surveillance, 
time-management and medical examinations, as intersecting with the high occurrence of 
resistance to the implementation of these disciplinary modes. He recounts various manifestations 
of the Egyptian conscripts’ discontents, citing many incidents of self-mutilation by the fellahin to 
evade conscription, as well as of a large uprising which took place in the Munufiyya province 
immediately after the introduction of conscription there in 1923, among many other instances of 
resistance and discontent.
46
 With perceptions of the Pasha as a “distant and impersonal leader”47, 
it appears that there is few evidence to support that the population felt it was part of Muhammed 
Ali’s acclaimed nation building process. Therefore, it is possible to say that although 
Muhammad Ali’s rule coined the genesis of the modern Egyptian state and army, it was not 
concerned, nor did it succeed at awakening Egyptians towards an independent and distinct 
nationalism or national identity.
48
  
Nevertheless, Muhammed Ali’s policies may have inadvertently led to the culmination of a sense 
of difference between ruler and ruled, setting early nationalist sentiments into motion, Staffing 
military ranks with Turks for instance, had led Arabic speaking military conscripts into a 
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position of inferiority, one which translated into an intensified sense of their ethnic and territorial 
identity; the latter which continues in force until today
49
 However, it was only in the 1870s that a 
new Egyptian elite began emerging, consisting of provincial notables, newly educated urban 
intelligentsia and middle ranks of the office corps; those which aimed at reconsidering the limits 
and nature of Egypt’s political community and its affiliation and allegiance to the khedival 
dynasty, yet one which is part of the Islamic ‘Umma 50  However, attempts to dominate the 
government, headed by the leadership of Ahmed ‘Urabi had unsurprisingly failed mainly as they 
threatened Anglo-French strategic and commercial interests in Egypt.
51
 By 1882, the Egyptian 
army was defeated in the battle of Tel-el Al Kebir by British forces, sweeping away ‘Urabi’s 
government, which had set out to challenge the established Ottoman ruling elite as well as the 
growing European finance capitalism in Egypt.
52
  
The introduction of a foreign, non-Muslim “other” is considered a central shift in the politics of 
reproduction of Egyptian nationalist discourse, bringing to the center debates over the 
appropriation of European ideologies such as liberalism and the reclamation of religious values 
amidst the incessant force of modernization. Therefore, what is most interest to us here, are the 
groups of nationalists which emerged only again in the early years of the twentieth century, 
allowing the issue of nationalist loyalties to surface, but in a rather different light. Rather than 
being a military-backed movement, the nationalist movements under Mustapha Kamel and Sa’d 
Zaghlul -explored next- point to a marked shift in Egyptian nationalist history with regards to 
their culmination as popular nationalist movements, rather than interest and military based 
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associations as under the ‘Urabi movement. Also, the newly introduced possibility of creating 
political parties, had allowed for the expression and proliferation of European-influenced ideas 
about governance, sovereignty and constitutionalism. The development and expression of a more 
distinct political ideology becomes apparent with the creation of the Watani party by Mustapha 
Kamil and later on through the liberal expositions of Lutfi Al Sayyid and Sa’d Zaghlul’s 
complex liberal nationalism. The intersection of these varyingly utilized “liberal” values with 
Islamic values and loyalties are best understood through analyzing the references along which 
early nationalist movements became popularized. As one of the aims of this chapter is to focus 
on the influence of political ideological and religious registers in the creation of modes of 
national belonging and loyalties in Egypt, it is best to begin with Mustapha’s Kamel’s political 
influence in shaping modern Egyptian discourse. 
Mustapha Kamil 
 
The first formal manifestation of a popular nationalist outcry came with Mustapha Kamel’s Al 
Watani Party. Although Kamel had been the leading nationalist figure in Egypt for over a 
decade, he only officially organized his movement into a political party in 1907.
53
 Kamel 
belonged to the generation that had benefitted from the schools established by Khedive Ismail 
and developed, although limitedly, under British rule.
54
 He had not received traditional education 
at Al Azhar but had a modern education, and by the time he had received his license in law from 
the University of Toulouse in 1894, he had already established himself as a nationalist leader.
55
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The vacuum left by the failure of the ‘Urabi movement56 allowed Kamil, with his young and 
enthusiastic persona, to capture the support and admiration of those around him.
57
. Eventually, 
the principles of the first, loosely formed, Watani Party were publicly presented to an audience 
of almost seven thousand people at the Zizinya Theatre in Alexandria on October 22
nd
, 1907.
58
  
One of the most important principals was the immediate evacuation of British forces
59
. 
Nationalism’s Early Engagements with Religion 
 
Most significant for the purposes of this chapter however, is the wider ideological framework 
within which Kamil’s nationalist message was formed. Kamil viewed Egyptian nationalism as 
operating under the wider umbrella of Ottoman authority and against British rule. In fact, 
Egyptian nationalism was seen as part of broader Muslim and Eastern identities, moving towards 
a diffuse sort of pan-Islamism. Interestingly, Kamil’s explication of Egyptian nationalism found 
no contradiction in espousing a clear affiliation with the Islamic caliphate as well as with the 
project of a modern Egyptian state, alluding to the centrality of Islam at the core of national 
identity. His nationalism worked towards an alienation of the British authorities, espousing the 
possibilities that a united Egyptian movement could bring to the dignity of the nation. I argue 
that Kamil’s ability to utilize both nationalist and religious references in framing the contours of 
the nationalist struggle, constituted a foundational discursive construction within Egyptian 
nationalism making it highly problematic to attempt a clear separation between the two. The 
genesis of the Egyptian nation on the frontlines of anti-colonialism drove a desire to assert a 
more concrete identity against foreign rule. This also had the effect of reformulating the limits of 
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religion and its place in an emerging national culture. On the popular level, Kamil’s ideological 
mergers remained unquestioned, as the drive for independence was sufficient as a unifying 
political message. Controversy and debate regarding his political project remained confined 
within literary and intellectual circles, whose medium of engagement was mainly academic 
journals that only enjoyed a miniscule readership among the majority of the population.
60
 
Because Kamil’s take on nationalism was also grounded in advocacy work and mobilization, he 
acquired great resonance with a population that was ready for leadership after the failure of the 
‘Urabi revolution. In exploring the dynamics of colloquial mass culture in Egypt in 1908, Ziad 
Fahmy argues that the populism of Mustafa Kamil’s party began the process of “defining and 
popularizing urban Egyptian nationalism”, even though the limits of this project were laid out 
within elite power circles.
61
 And if there were to exist any doubt regarding the extent of Kamil’s 
popularity throughout his years of activism, then his funeral would come as a great testimony to 
the powerful influence of his political message. Kamil died on the 10
th
 of February 1908, only 
one year after the creation of the Watani party. The following is an excerpt from a letter written 
by Sir Eldon Gorst to Sir Edward Grey describing the funeral and the extent to which Kamil had 
successfully asserted himself as one of the country’s first nationalist leaders.62 
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The cortège was accompanied by the Grand Cadi [Qadi], the Sheikh of the El Azhar [al-Azhar] 
University, and a number of Notables, some of whom had previously held high posts under the 
Government. The procession was headed by students of all the secondary and higher schools and 
colleges in Cairo, who had absented themselves from their studies en masse, and who marched 
in good order in ranks of four. After the Notables came a great crowd composed of people of the 
lower middle class, minor government employees, and small shop-keepers. Some idea can be 
formed of the magnitude of this crowd by the fact that it took fifty minutes to pass by a certain 
spot. . .
63
 
 This mass ritual, perhaps Egypt’s first national funeral, was expansively covered by all 
newspapers, exposing snapshots of a national symbol in the making. The kind of emotional 
capital that was accumulated by Kamil would come to be used by later nationalist figures.
64
 And 
up until this day, Kamil’s memory easily evokes un-contested principles of nationalism which sit 
comfortably with Islamic loyalties and affiliations. 
Egyptians’ Encounter with Liberalism as a National Political Ideology 
  
Although Kamil’s popularity was unquestionable and his articulation of Egyptian nationalism 
undeniably influential, his political ideology did not go uncontested. As political party life began 
to take on a more diverse form in early twentieth century Egypt, a number of political thinkers 
appeared on the public arena attempting to operationalize the growing sentiments of popular 
nationalism along political ideological lines, very much influenced by changing global powers 
and the rise of liberal doctrines in the West. Named the father of Egyptian liberalism, Ahmed 
Lutfi Al Sayyid was one of the most ardent figures in shaping a liberal secular ideology in an 
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Egyptian nationalist context. He created and headed the ‘Umma Party in 1907, which was 
distinctively more secular and liberal than Mustafa Kamil’s Watani party. Ideologically, Al-
Sayyid perceived Egyptian nationalism as expressive of a distinct national community, clearly 
set apart from the Ottoman order. He was one of the most outspoken proponents of a philosophy 
of nationalism based on distinct civil and political rights as opposed to an understanding of 
national unity as based on a shared Islamic culture.  
Al Sayyid's project explicated a kind of Egyptian nationalism defined along clear liberal values 
and advocating secular systems of governance. He was thus interested in a definition of 
nationalism that unfolded along clearly definable ideological values and principals. The extent to 
which this school of liberal thought flourished under Al Sayyid remains debatable. His work, 
although resonant among intellectual circles of the 1920s elite in Egypt, did not find in mass 
support the recognition that would allow it to endure the political and social tribulations that 
would carry Egypt through the century. This was partially due to the classist nature of his party, 
whose elite constituency was often seen as disengaged from popular social forces and local 
needs. The party’s top-to-bottom approach to social reform narrowed spaces for innovative and 
popular tools of governance, limiting their powers of garnering popular support. The exposure of 
Lutfi Al Sayyid’s work also had a negative impact on the resonance of his message. His 
nationalist philosophy was expounded piecemeal in newspaper articles over the period of four to 
five years and was almost inaccessible to wider illiterate or politically uninterested sections of 
the population.
65
 The force of liberalism as a nationally unifying ideology was limited through its 
dissociation from popular social bases and its premise on classist ideas of national power 
relations.  In other words, the fact that Al Sayyid’s project was primarily based on ideological 
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explications and less on popular values and mobilizing slogans, resulted in popular disinclination 
from his liberal nationalism. However, other national figures from Lufti’s school managed to 
more effectively espouse nationalist sentiments through mobilizing popular support and 
practicing a sort of accommodative liberalism. Such was the case with Sa’d Zaghlul, who was 
one of Al ‘Umma party’s main members, but broke off from it to create the infamous Wafd party.  
Sa’d Zaghlul’s Populist Nationalism 
 
The end of the war in 1918 brought with it a change in the power structures involved in the 
propagation of Egyptian nationalism. That is, from a movement of the middle and upper urban 
classes, it developed into one which was able to command the active support of almost the entire 
people at times of crisis.
66
 After the Ottoman Empire joined the Central Powers in 1914, Egypt 
was unilaterally declared a protectorate under British rule, resulting in the deposal of ‘Abbas 
Hilmi and his replacement with his more malleable uncle, Sa’id Pasha67 Thousands of peasants 
were conscripted for service with the Allied forces in Palestine, food grew scarce as too much 
land was given to the production of cotton, and the presence of a growing foreign army created  
more tangible interactions with what was seen as a hostile occupation.
68
 The shared popular 
sentiments that emerged after the war as a result of these developments were captured and 
mobilized by Sa’d Zaghlul’s Wafd party.69  When the war ended, Egyptians began forming a 
delegation to present Egypt’s case for independence at the Paris Peace Conference, one which 
Zaghlul stepped up to head. The request to participate in the conference however, was refused by 
British authorities, setting in place the chain of events that would trigger the 1919 revolution 
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which famously called for the unification of Egyptians regardless of religion or class, against 
British rule. 
Understanding the significance of global politics is critical in contextualizing popular affiliations 
with the nationalist movement of 1919. The forces of anti-colonialism were formative of 
numerous spaces of cultural and local political engagement in the period leading up to the 1919 
revolution. In an attempt to evade the gaze of the colonial authorities, people found in culture 
and the arts fertile grounds to express their dis-affectation. Satirical periodicals with colloquial 
Egyptian content, burlesque comedy plays, taqatiq (Colloquial songs) and colloquial poetry 
became highly popular and acted as spaces for decoded discourses, and as a medium through 
which identities were negotiated.
70
 Sa’d Zaghlul’s own initiatives as Minister of education in 
1907, included the introduction of a course called al-tarbiyya-al-qawmiyya (National 
upbringing) into educational curricula mainly to offset the khedival decree which called for the 
separation of Muslims and Christians in classes on religion.
71
 The introduction of the new 
subject was situated within a growing discourse that pitted relations among citizens as a national, 
rather than a sectarian affair.
72
  
Significantly, Sa’d Zaghlul’s approach to populism was also entangled with his own religious 
conceptions. He remained loyal to the idea that any legal system ought to maintain its roots 
within Islamic jurisprudence, and in that sense, was up-taking an approach which would set him 
apart from his land-owning elite secular companions, the likes of Lutfi Al Sayyid and ‘Ali Abd 
el Raziq.  Zaghlul, along with his party, gradually came to be seen as the voice of the Egyptian 
nation and of Egyptian nationalism. This was a nationalism which was liberal in the sense that it 
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was geared towards the liberal values of constitutionalism, yet did not go far beyond that to 
address issues such as secularism and freedom of individual choice. In fact, Sa’d Zaghlul and his 
party were of the strong opponents against one of Sheikh Ali Abd el Raziq’s progressive works 
about the re-interpretation of Islamic Governance in  Al-Islam wa ’osool al-hokm. Zaghlul’s rule 
was conservative in the sense that it harbored little capacity for more revolutionary and 
progressive debates on matters concerning religion, dogma and freedom of personal choice. His 
rule was more geared towards the goal of independence and the constitutional amendments 
necessary for that to be achieved. Leading the populist nationalist movement, the Wafd Party 
rose to a highly influential place in Egyptian politics and in the minds of ordinary Egyptians. 
Crucially, it played a central role in the creation of Egypt’s 1923 constitution and in transitioning 
the country from dynastic rule to constitutional monarchy.  
  
However, by the 1940s, the Wafd had come under increased scrutiny as its leadership was taken 
over by more wealthy capitalist landowners and self- interested politicians, the likes of Sirag Al 
Din Pasha and Mustapha Al Nahhas. The promise of independence went unfulfilled and the 
nationalist discourse of the Wafd became largely discredited as its members focused on personal 
power gains, leaving frustrated larger social and political demands of reform and independence.
73
 
By 1943, Makram ‘Ubeid, the secretary general of the party between the years 1936 and 1942, 
had published his “Black Book” as an expose of corruption in the Wafd starting with Mustapha 
Al Nahhas onwards.
74
 The popular base that had accumulated under Sa’d Zaghlul had found 
limited spaces for popular participation and inclusion into the nationalist project, after the 
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leader’s death.75 His liberal nationalism soon lost its resonance among a disenchanted public 
whose main aim was to gain independence from colonial rule. Instead, Egyptians had to contend 
with a consumed and detached intelligentsia, which only focused on the ‘elite’ conditions of the 
polity, failing to capitalize on popular support as an integral element for recreating the emotive 
and mobilizing power of nationalism.
76
    
The ideology of the Wafd and its ability to govern the people increasingly came under attack and 
by the late 1940s the party was dismantling from within. Simultaneously, voices of Islamic 
opposition, mainly from the ‘ulama and the Muslim Brotherhood, were gaining ground. Founded 
in 1928 by sheikh Hassan Al Banna, the Muslim Brotherhood was created as an Islamic 
organization concerned with creating a political, social and religious movement. Involved in the 
struggle for national independence, its members were greatly concerned with addressing what 
they perceived as the moral degradation of the Islamic community under British rule. However, 
by the 1940s it had become clear that members of the local elite, namely members of the Wafd, 
had drifted further from attaining the goal of independence. It became easy to point out 
corruption, class discrepancies and what they viewed to be a moral and ethical deterioration of 
local culture associated with the western-oriented populism of the Wafd. Retrospectively, it 
might be possible to say that from the beginning Zaghlul was less interested in espousing a 
particular ideology than he was concerned with achieving national independence; the latter 
ultimately ended up being his main historical marker. And indeed, he is part of national memory 
not as a liberal, as per his acclaimed ideological grounding, but as a popular leader whose 
nationalist project called for the inclusion of all classes and sects of the Egyptian nation. 
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Important also throughout these two decades, is the solidification of the limits of national 
community, whereby being “Egyptian” came to occupy greater importance in constructing the 
popular legitimacy of national rulers. Increased discontent and lack of sentiments of belonging 
towards the monarchy, and especially towards British authorities, demonstrated an emphasis on 
the idea of “retrieving” the nation, and handing it back to its rightful owners. The construction of 
national identity and modes of national belonging at this time are also very much intertwined 
with conceptions and imageries of an organic, territorially bound community. This kind of 
territorial solidarity becomes deeply connected with the role of the Egyptian military, which 
since its creation in 1820 by Muhammad Ali, had engaged in the making of the modern Egyptian 
subject, for instance as seen with Egyptian soldiers and officers development of a sense of 
inferiority or inequality enacted between them and foreign officers and soldiers. More so, the 
military institution acted as one of the few institutions where Egyptian soldiers could experience 
some forms of social mobility within its ranks, and as such potentially affecting the ideological 
and political orientation of the institution as Egyptian officers became increasingly involved in 
its ranks. The growth of a sense of national belonging within one of the oldest political 
institutions of the modern state, had cast the Egyptian military as increasingly concerned with the 
protection of the territorial modern nation, and as an important player in the struggle for 
independence.  
It therefore appears that the ideological framework of liberalism survived for two decades, not 
through its own right, but rather because of its intertwining with a nationalist discourse that was 
premised on a larger, more inclusive goal of independence; one that was aimed towards both 
territorial and political freedom from all forms of foreign occupation The central place in 
44 
 
Egyptian nationalist discourse regarding the sovereignty of the “nation” and the self-governance 
of its national community would culminate in a kind of territorial nationalism under Nasser and 
his Free Officer’s movement.  
Understanding Nasser between Ideology and the Military 
 
The July 23
 
revolution headed by Gamal Abdel Nasser and the take-over of the Free Officers, 
represents a different positionality between political ideology and nationalist discourse.  It is true 
that the end of Egypt’s ‘liberal’ period had coincided with Nasser’s rise to power. However, 
Nasser’s capturing of nationalist sentiments and his transformation of the nationalist discourse 
had not initially been premised on ideological grounds. As seen with Kamil and Zaghlul, 
political ideologies, even though upheld as the defining markers of political eras, actually 
appeared as secondary to wider nationalist claims. That is, focusing on ideology as the 
mobilizing force behind Nasser’s popularity is also misleading in a number of ways.  First, it 
assumes that a period of liberal rule had taken its course in Egyptian politics, when in actuality, 
liberalism seems to have been the conceptual preoccupation of literary, high culture, and 
theoretical elite-centered debates. The foundational premise of Egyptian nationalism, that is, had 
less to do with an affiliation to a specific liberal ideology, and much more to do with a 
politicized territoriality set against foreign occupation in the context of changing understandings 
of the place of Egypt in a changing global order. Second, it is crucial to realize that the coup of 
the Free Officers did not begin by heralding mass support for socialism, nor did it initially 
embrace a clear political ideology of its own.
77
 In his work on Nasser’s movement, Joel Gordon 
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argues that the events of July 23, 1952 had caused few to lament the actions of the army.
78
 
Disillusionment with the parliamentary system and its inability to lead the way to independence, 
had allowed nationalist energies to be captured by an institution towards which there existed 
little doubt concerning its patriotic character and nationalist duty: that of the Egyptian military. 
The Free Officers’ military affiliation, and the institutional support it provided them, allowed 
them leverage in asserting order and in capturing sentiments of loyalty and belonging to a 
popular nationalist movement
79
 That is, it appears that the appeal of the Egyptian army itself had 
initially been more powerful than any specific ideological orientation. The force of Nasser’s 
ideological project was not initially recognized by many of Egypt’s political elite as a threat to 
their power. That would soon change, as his political ideology began to take shape, although that 
would not begin until almost a year after his victory.  
 The Growth of a Statist National Ideology 
 
Rather than a well-defined political ideology and a mass following, the Free Officers’ main bid 
for power was to establish a strong centralized state and cultivate popular legitimacy for military 
rule. The new Egyptian state grew on the basis of the expansion of the two dominant institutions 
of the armed forces and the Egyptian bureaucracy, both of which are still as dominant in today’s 
Egypt. Rapid expansion of the public sector along with the nationalization of numerous 
industries and the enactment of the land reform laws, not only had the effect of cementing the 
new regime’s power to mobilize resources, it had also created a new class of Egyptians’ whose 
interests were closely tied to the state.
80
 Under the new regime, citizens were to expect free state 
education, a job in the government apparatus, as well as state-sponsored pension after retirement.  
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Political parties which were controlled by the elite of the 1930s and 1940s, most important of 
which were the liberal Wafd and Umma parties, were victims of attempts of elimination and by 
January 1953 all political parties were outlawed. .
81
 In fact, Nasser’s political authoritarianism 
and social welfare put in place a clear statist dimension to national loyalty, whereby citizens’ 
relations to the new nation became primarily expressed through a glorification of the Egyptian 
state. In other words, nationalism became expressed through the promise of the Egyptian state to 
include all national classes within its ranks, making citizens part of the process of national 
development and the drive for self-sufficiency and full independence.  
Nasser’s Territorial Nationalism 
 
 The fact that statism became one of the defining pillars of Nasser’s Egypt however, does not in 
turn mean that no efforts at furthering a particular political ideology took place. Arab nationalism 
and Arab socialism were both adopted by the regime as the necessary vehicles of change, 
steering the nation away from a bygone era.  The political ideology of socialism allowed 
Nasser’s statism to continue, for it made accessible a systemic language with which to address 
social inequality, corruption, education, health care, and even women’s rights as domains which 
could be bettered through state intervention. The Egyptian military, on the other hand, had been 
central to the propagation of Arab nationalism and its role as part of a regional alliance against 
Western and Israeli intervention. It is important to contextualize the move towards Arab 
nationalism within the nationalist discourse of the time. First of all, Nasser repeatedly 
emphasized the coexistence and compatibility of his Egyptian and Arab loyalties, often using the 
term “Arab Egypt” in his speeches.82 However, despite repeated assertions of the unity and 
                                                          
81
 Gordon, 4. 
82
 Egypt, Ministry of National Guidance, Majmu’at Khutab wa Tasrihat wa Bayanat al-Ra’is Jamal ‘Abd al-Nasir 
(multivol; cairo), 1: 155. 
47 
 
solidarity of the members of the Arab nation, when asked whether his sense of collective identity 
was more Arab or Egyptian, Nasser’s response was an unreserved articulation of his self-
identification as an “Egyptian coupled with a more contingent sense of Arab affiliation”83 In fact 
it was the practical utility of solidarity as Arabs that Nasser emphasized as the motive force 
behind Arab nationalism.
84
 It was a strategic necessity, a defensive necessity as well as common 
interests which rather compelled Arabs towards unity.
85
 More so, in line with the territorial 
nationalism of Nasser, and the pivotal role that the Egyptian Army played in securing Egyptian 
independence and sovereignty, Arab nationalism was built with the pioneering role of the 
Egyptian army, at its epicenter. As such, Arab nationalism continued to retain Egyptian 
leadership within the region, and the propagation of Arab nationalism in Egypt focused on the 
benefits and interests to the Egyptian nation. More so, realizing that involvement in the Arab 
nationalist movement had developed well after the formation of the Egyptian state and where the 
existing territorial state was the main element in the political field, allows for a better 
understanding of the relationship between a transnational movement like Arab nationalism and 
its integration with Egyptian territorial nationalism.
86
   
The position of Egypt within the region was premised on the belief of the unmatched strength of 
its army compared to other countries of the region .More so, the strength and legitimacy of the 
Egyptian state, was cemented in its military-backed ability to defend the people’s interests from 
the corruption of the pre-revolutionary elite ensuring it remained within the truly patriotic hands 
of its current leaders. That is, through constant valorization of the territorial nation, linking its 
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survival with the role of the military, the main referent of Egyptian nationalist discourse became 
the fervor of a strong territorial state.  
Nationalizing Religion under Nasser 
 
The place of religious discourse in the nationalist narrative was also greatly affected by the 
statism of Nasser. That is, although Nasser espoused a secular ideology, his regime could not, 
and did not, follow a similar process of secularization as the one that had taken place in Turkey 
in 1924 by Mustapha Kemal Ataturk. Instead of eliminating religion from public social life, the 
1952 regime sought to control religion as well as influence the kinds of uses it was put to. 
Consequently, after consolidating his position as the leader of the Revolutionary Council in 
1954, Nasser dissolved the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood on January 13, 1954, despite 
the hopes that the latter had with the establishment of Nasser’s nationalist project.87 The 
Brotherhood’s continued existence as an independent organization, as well as one which had 
repeatedly made calls for the application of shari’a law, had provoked the leader into silencing 
the voices of Islamic discontent. Additionally, the attempt made on Nasser’s life on October 26, 
1954, for which the Muslim Brotherhood was profiled and accused despite denial of many of its 
accused members, gave Nasser the pretext he needed to dismantle the organization.
88
 
Consequently, hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood leaders were tried in courts, and six were 
hanged in December of the same year.
89
  As noted by Timothy Mitchell,  
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“On July 23, 1952 the Muslim Brothers joined with the rest of Egypt in celebrating the dawn of a 
new era; twenty-nine months later, six of the Society’s members died on the gallows, and the 
organization was destroyed almost beyond repair.”90 
 In addition to silencing the Muslim Brotherhood as the most important Islamic opponent to the 
regime, Nasser took control over private and public mosques, placing them under the direct 
supervision of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Such was an attempt at ensuring that local 
preachers followed and endorsed a state-approved narrative of Islam and religious teachings.
91
 
And to best gain control over the content of the Islamic message transmitted to the public, Nasser 
proceeded to gain control over Al Azhar by bringing its financial assets under the control of the 
state. By doing so, he successfully curbed the institution’s autonomy and forced it to depend on 
the state for financial support.
92
 Rather than a process of secularization, what was unfolding was 
rather a process of nationalizing Islam. The new regime’s legitimacy still hinged on its ability to 
present itself as the righteous leader and moral keeper of the national community. The 
nationalization of religious bodies and institutions gave the state monopoly over the 
interpretation of religion, and at the same time created a nationalist discourse in which the use of 
religion remained a key link between the modernizing state and its population.
93
 
Nasser’s nation building project was thus largely premised on the territorial and statist 
dimensions of nationalism, through which socialism and pan-Arabism were represented and 
engaged with. In addition, Nasser was able to force the country’s two most important liberal 
political parties out of the political arena. Associating the ideological project of liberalism with 
the fouls of colonial occupation and British manipulation, their place in national history soon 
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became conceptualized as a part of an unwanted past. Liberalism became associated with elitist 
and westernized political practices.  
Intertwining Religion with National Identity: Sadat’s Road to Legitimacy 
 
The end of Nasser’s rule with his death on September 8th, 1970, bore with it the still-fresh 
memory of Egypt’s shattering defeat in the 1967 war against Israel, leading to the latter’s 
occupation of the Sinai Peninsula in Egypt. Sadat’s mission as new president was thus geared 
towards the liberation of Sinai from Israeli occupation while maintaining social order and 
political legitimacy among the population. In order to do so, Sadat found in the use of religious 
discourse a way of framing and identifying his new regime. Sadat offered a more 
accommodative environment to Islamic movements, specifically the Muslim Brotherhood, 
releasing many of its members from jail and allowing the free circulation of the organization’s 
journal. This shift in approach meant to signify a break from Nasser’s “Godless secularism” as 
the Muslim Brotherhood had called it, in a bid by Sadat to acquire wider popular bases of 
legitimacy. More so, by portraying himself as the “believer president” (Al Ra’ees al mo’men), 
Islamic discourse was put at the center of the national imagery and Islam and piety were 
presented as some of the more important values associated with national leadership. This is also 
strikingly apparent in the amendment of Article (2) of the Egyptian constitution which came to 
decree that Islamic Shari’a be considered the main source of legislation, as opposed to a source 
of legislation. Religion, as such, became intertwined with the construction of national identity, 
once again through instituting popularly held Islamic values and principals within the discourse 
of the state and its bodies.   
More specifically, Sadat’s quest for controlling opposition, particularly that of the die-hard 
Nasserists and leftists, had first of all, led him to remove most of them from their posts in the 
51 
 
upper echelons of the regime and from the Arab Socialist Union (ASU).
94
 More so, between the 
years 1971 and 1975, Sadat coupled his fights against the left with granting general amnesty to 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, gradually releasing them from prison, in hopes that they 
would provide a counterweight to the Nasserist left.
95
 The Muslim Brotherhood’s mouthpiece, 
Al- da’wa journal was allowed publication and its circulation was reported to have reached 
eighty to a hundred thousand copies per month at its height
96
, alluding to the increasing 
popularity of the organization and of their Islamic outlook on public life, which had mainly been 
concerned with the reformation of the state and society through the application of the Islamic 
shari’a.97 Although the Muslim Brotherhood may have intended to adopt a more gradualist 
approach to Islamic reform under Sadat, their hopes of becoming a legitimate political party 
were smashed when Sadat issued the 1977 Political Party Law which would ban the creation of 
political parties on the basis of religion. The result was an organization which was neither inside 
nor outside the national system, for it was not formally acknowledged as a political party yet it 
was one which still garnered popularity in parliament through its individually elected members.
98
 
However, by the late 1970s, members from the Brotherhood became increasingly vocal about the 
social inequalities that have been growing under Sadat’s infitah (opening of the economy to 
market forces) as well as his heavy handed control of dissent and opposition. However, the 
termination of the relatively amicable relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and Sadat 
strikingly came with his visit to Jerusalem in 1977, following which the peace treaty with Israel 
was signed in 1979. In an attempt to control the social and political outrage over signing the 
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peace treaty, in 1981, Sadat arrested more than 1,500 civic and political leaders from across the 
ideological spectrum. Included of course were members of the Muslim Brotherhood, who only a 
month later would move to assassinate the president on October 6, 1981.
99
 
Additionally, religious discourse was used by Sadat to lend popular legitimacy to the more 
extensive role that would be taken on by the military during the 1973 war with Israel. Engaging 
the military body within patriotic and religious frameworks was constitutive of the processes by 
which the military institution in Egypt has come to accumulate national and moral capital among 
the people. Perhaps this is particularly apparent in present day Egypt with Abdel Fattah el Sisi’s 
popular coming to power in 2013.  However, Sadat did not in fact put forth a clear political 
ideology for his regime. What manifested instead was a political project that found in religious 
accommodation fertile grounds for creating popular legitimacy. At the same time, it was one 
whose nationalist discourse was most avidly expressed through regional politics and territorial 
victories. The central position occupied by military victories in Sadat’s era also came with an 
expansion in the privileges of the officer corps. That is, in order to ensure military generals’ 
political acquiescence, particularly in the post-war period, Sadat proceeded to plant the seeds of 
the military’s economic empire that would take its full form under Mubarak. This kind of 
expansion was aimed at rebranding the military as a major contributor to national prosperity as 
well as ensure venues for top officials to pursue their private interests.
100
 More so, Sadat’s 
ideational links with the Egyptian military had arguably become strengthened as he shifted away 
from Pan-Arabism towards an “Egypt-first” orientation; one which would prove to be quite 
popular with the army generals. Sadat verified this shift in the post-war era by arguing that it in 
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the 1973 war, “it was Egyptians who dies while other Arab states postured and orated,”101, 
further solidifying the territorial nation as a main marker of Egyptian national identity. 
Spaces for Ideological Contestation Under Sadat 
 
The Political Party law (law 40 of 1977) issued by Sadat excluded the formation of parties based 
on class, religion or regional affiliation.
102
 The law was issued against the background of the 
1977 bread riots, which were a reaction to limiting government spending on public goods and 
services as a result of the harsh conditions of the IMF’s economic liberalization policies. In an 
effort to check spaces for ideological or political opposition, Sadat proceeded to create the 
National Democratic Party (NDP) in 1977 with a base of urban and rural bureaucrats. This was 
significant in the creation of a class of statists who were supportive of the regime. The NDP 
portrayed its character as a national one, representative of all groups of the nation, yet in doing 
so, espoused no clear political ideology, such as that of Nasser’s socialism. The basis of 
inclusion within the party had thus developed along statist lines, whereby support of the regime 
became the defining feature of its members, rather than ideological, sectarian or classist 
identifications with it. Additionally, the crackdown on ideological and political opposition 
included Islamists and Islamic organizations and whose growing power was blatantly felt with 
the assassination of Al Sadat in 1981 by members of Al Gama’a Al Islamiya. 
Therefore, it is possible to see the ways in which political ideology came to take on a less 
emphatic role and resonance under Sadat. The creation of his own political party along statist 
lines as opposed to clear ideological assimilations, had set the tone for the NDP for the years to 
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come as statist relations continued to grow and solidify under Mubarak. At the same time, the 
references along which national community was iterated and imagined came to lay on religious 
lines of identification, emphasizing the place of Islam as an intrinsic part of national identity. 
Sadat’s national legacy is also defined by his military “master plan” of retrieving Egyptian 
territory, as such reviving a kind of territorial nationalism among Egyptians.  The role of political 
ideology, therefore, was lost amidst grander schemes of national inclusion. Sadat’s vision of an 
inclusive national identity therefore alternatively emphasized the role of religion and the 
territorial nation in shaping the nation. Islamic opposition, on the other hand, was to remain as 
the main face of ideological opposition throughout the following decades. 
A State of Ideological Incoherence under Mubarak 
 
Upon coming to power, Hosni Mubarak initially adopted a reconciliatory approach regarding 
political participation. A son of the military institution, Mubarak capitalized on this legitimacy as 
a military-backed national leader by demonstrating an observable increase in tolerance for spaces 
of political expression, mainly through allowing increased circulation of independent newspapers 
and licensing new opposition parties.
103
  Mubarak made a point of declaring that he was neither 
Nasser nor Sadat and it is true that he did not completely follow in any of his predecessors 
footsteps.
 104
 However, neither did he construct a clear ideological project of his own. By the late 
1990s, power struggles within the NDP between the Old guard- namely the statists and 
supporters of the regime- and between emerging younger groups of businessmen, had begun 
taking over the operational capacity of the party and members were hardly ideologically unified. 
Instead of putting forth a clear ideological project, the NDP grew in line with the neo-liberal 
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economic policies adopted by the state, aided by the emergence of powerful economic groups 
with their own interests to persevere and grow. Importantly so, the party managed to create 
networks of patronage and clientelism that acted as wide and interconnected power bases, 
allowing its survival for thirty years. That is, rather than allowing for political participation or an 
ethos of accountability, the NDP functioned through managing and controlling the political elite, 
as well as engaging lower rank intermediaries from the general population.
105
 Over the years, 
various political and socio-economic groups were able to find ways to benefit from the regime 
and construct ways for their inclusion into its power networks. For instance, on the level of local 
governance, the growing needs of an expanding population coupled with an overburdened 
bureaucracy allowed for the formation of informal networks and relations of interest between 
government employees and lower rank intermediaries from the general population. The bases on 
which relations were formed were thus centered on the possibilities of inclusion within the 
economic and political networks of the state, rather than on a clear ideological congruence or 
assimilation with its national party. 
This lack of an ideational link also seemed to be the case with Mubarak’s relationship with the 
military. Although it remained that presidents’ survival in office depended on allying the leaders 
of the nation’s coercive apparatus to their rule, the post-war period of stability under Mubarak 
necessitated engaging various other means for upholding the army and its officers in high 
status.
106
   Having no grand mission to offer the officers as champions of the poor or liberators of 
the occupied national territory, retired officers were promised- and indeed occupied- hundreds of 
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managerial positions in the Armed forces economic empire.
107
 The creation of a parallel 
economic system for the Egyptian military took place through the establishment of non-defense 
businesses, including factories, military clubs and hotels, all of which operated outside the 
control and supervision of parliament and the Organization of Administrative Monitoring 
(Hay’at al-raqaba al-idariyya).108 The military-industrial-business-commercial complex 
(MIBCC) in Egypt progressively grew with Mubarak’s neo-liberal turn, as new avenues for 
ensuring officers’ allegiance to the regime appeared with the new economic changes.109 More so, 
retired officers and generals were given high status posts in bureaucratic and state institutions all 
over the country, and throughout Mubarak’s years in power, almost 40 percent of the governors 
appointed by him, came from the military institution.
110
  
Nevertheless, the struggle for ideological legitimacy increasingly became problematic with the 
rise of Islamic opposition groups. Although Islamic militants were crushed in the early 1990s 
through a vicious government-led counter insurgency, their appearance on the scene years later 
was aided by the growth of a parallel Islamic sector under Mubarak.
 111
 This involved a growth 
in the numbers of Islamic voluntary associations such as welfare societies, cultural organizations, 
schools and health clinics, as well as an increase in the number of Islamic banks, publishing 
houses and investment companies
112
 Some of these institutions belonged to the larger network of 
the Muslim Brotherhood, while others represented individual projects of piety. The growth of 
institutions of an Islamic character are reflective of the normalized positions that piety and 
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religiosity have come to assert in the everyday lives of the Egyptian citizenry. Their popularity is 
significant in understanding the highly cherished values of Islam and religiosity to the Egyptian 
public, which will appear consequential with the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood to power. 
The weakness of the ideological character of Mubarak’s nationalism meant that Islamic 
discourse could find more fertile ground to grow with little competition from a contending 
national ideology. At the same time, the vagueness of Mubarak’s ideological project allowed for 
a more spacious and inclusive understanding of national community which was not hindered by 
ideological limits or barriers. It is particularly this sense of ideological ‘indifference’ which sets 
in contrast the exclusionary and highly ideological project of the Muslim Brotherhood that 
unfolded upon their coming to power in 2012. Congruently, the Muslim Brotherhood’s existence 
as outside of the nation’s prime nationalist institution, namely the Egyptian military, cast doubt 
on the question of their national loyalty among groups of the population. The ways in which the 
Brotherhood’s rule was experienced as a self-interested project, set apart from the wider national 
community, become more apparent through the everyday practices of members of the 
organization among local residents of ‘Ain el-Sira. The extent to which sentiments of national 
inclusion and belonging have been experienced by local residents during the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s rule, will be explored in the next two chapters. 
Conclusion 
By focusing on the references through which macro-level discourses of Egyptian nationalism 
were constructed by regime leaders throughout modern history, this chapter sets the stage for a 
more contextualized analysis of citizens’ own constructions of national belonging. In other 
words, it offers a framework for observing the development of the conceptual and moral limits of 
Egyptian nationalism. Egyptian nationalism seems to have grown through the historical 
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intertwining of religious discourse and modes of national belonging. The co-existence of these 
two spaces of identity formation allows us to see the experience with the Muslim Brotherhood 
beyond the dichotomous positions of national belonging and religious loyalty. The point, rather, 
is to look for the modes of inclusion into the national community that nationalist ideologies like 
political Islam, trigger in popular imagination. The continuous struggle to realize the promise of 
national inclusion, as mentioned earlier, is usually played out on the level of state practices as 
citizens’ interact with state representatives and institutions. The growth of the bureaucratic 
apparatus along with its networks of relations and interests, as well as the growth of a statist 
ideology, played a significant role in shaping previous nationalist projects. Understanding the 
modes of inclusion propagated by the project of the Muslim Brotherhood, is thus crucial in 
situating the ability of the Muslim Brotherhood to maintain popular support. The next two 
chapters explore the spaces and instances in which inclusion into the national project became 
perceived by residents under the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. 
Another point made throughout this chapter is about the specific conditions required for political 
ideologies to manifest into mobilizing and unifying nationalist discourses. As shown above, 
Egypt’s turn of the century encounter with liberal politics attests to the efficacy of liberalism as a 
unifying nationalist discourse upon its linking with the grand objective of national independence. 
Nasser’s political ideologies of socialism and Pan-Arabism were able to effectively manifest 
based on the emotive power it drew from the nationalist spirit of the Egyptian military institution 
and its role in reclaiming national territory. The power of political ideology as a unifying 
national force in Egypt therefore seems contingent on its existence within a wider narrative of 
unity and belonging; one which is triggered by highly emotive and unifying events such as 
national independence, war victories and regional advancements.  
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Realizing these trends is useful in analyzing the general failure of the ideological project of the 
Muslim Brotherhood by understanding the specific ways in which nationalism and religion have 
historically been constructed as constitutive of one another. That is, the case of Egypt shows that 
nationalist ties have been understood to be inclusive of certain modes of religiosity, whereby 
Islamic values and principals played a critical role in shaping modern Egyptians’ social and 
political relations. Yet, the politicization of religious discourse and its use as part of an over-
riding ideological project under the Muslim Brotherhood, triggered processes in which religious 
and national identity became portrayed and experienced as dichotomous forces. The ideological 
character of the Muslim Brotherhood thus allowed the organization to be perceived and 
experienced as divisive, limiting and exclusionary among many sections of the population.  
Finally, in order to read beyond the fall of the Muslim brotherhood in Egypt as a victory of civil 
and secular national ties, over religious ones, this chapter shed light on the specific position of 
the Military institution in Egyptian nationalist history. The privileged position of the Egyptian 
military and its unequivocal role in furthering a kind of territorial nationalism has allowed it to 
persistently occupy an uncontested capacity as guardian of the nation, in both its territorial and 
imagined form. Important, are the intrinsic ties between past ruling regimes and the military, 
which have awarded the former wider spaces for national mobilization through displaying their 
belonging to the nation and identifying with its most patriotic institution. The Muslim 
Brotherhood’s existence as a force outside of the military institution cast its nationalist identity 
and loyalty in doubt. This is most obviously seen in the high levels of popularity and mass 
mobilization prompted by the appearance of army General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi and his leading 
role in the take-over of power from the Muslim Brotherhood in July 2013. The army’s clear 
nationalist orientation, in contrast to the Muslim Brotherhood’s separate and distinct ideology of 
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political Islam, seemingly touched upon wider imagined spaces for inclusion within the national 
project, consequently gaining the support of millions of Egyptians.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
‘Ain el-Sira: Local Community Life and Everyday Modes of Belonging 
 
This chapter will explore the socio-political features of ’Ain el-Sira in order to situate modes of 
national belonging among residents as seen through their regular interactions with bodies and 
representatives of ruling regimes, namely the NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood. Beyond 
viewing equality and national belonging as abstract notions of nationalism, this chapter aims to 
place the meaning of nationalism in the struggle for power distribution between the ruling elite 
and citizens, as played out at the level of state practices. One of the spaces in which the struggle 
for national inclusion is played out is through residents’ interactions with local state personnel in 
’Ain el-Sira, such as with police officers and employees of the local municipality. The 
appearance of the Muslim Brotherhood as a distinct power group in the neighborhood in 2012 is 
also analyzed through the extent to which the struggle for power-sharing and inclusion in the 
national project was being shaped through the organization’s political and social presence and 
practices in the neighborhood. The relationship between nationalism and religious loyalty thus 
shifts, in order to recognize the banal and everyday spaces through which citizens may come to 
experience Islamic rule when presented through a politically-organized and distinct authority. 
This is in contrast to the normalization and acceptance of pious and moral Islamic values in their 
personal and public lives. More so, the chapter focuses on the modes of social organization in the 
neighborhood. This is necessary in order to situate the development of local power groups, those 
which I term the “notables” of the community. One of the most salient features of interaction 
between local state authorities and notables lies in their dependence on informal and personal 
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modes of recognition of one another. As such, this chapter aims to shed light on some of the 
alternative modes of inclusion: those which manifest through informal relations with state 
representatives, as well as through personal relationships built on local forms of familiarity and 
recognition. 
The Significance of ‘Ain el-Sira  
 
One of the reasons why ‘Ain el-Sira was chosen for this research has been its unique social and 
political history. That is, instead of situating ‘Ain el-Sira as one of the many sha’bi or informal 
areas growing around the outskirts of Cairo beginning the 1960s, with the all-too-familiar 
narrative of poverty, illiteracy, extremism and crime prevalent in these areas, ‘Ain el-Sira has 
arguably experienced a rather different history. Based on interviews with some of the old 
residents of the area, as well as with workers in Al Geel Center, ‘Ain el-Sira appears as home to 
one of the leaders of the leftist student movement of the 1970s. Ahmed Abdallah Rozza, most 
famous for his leftist views and life-long struggle towards opening up spaces for civil 
participation and equality among the different classes of society, was a ‘son’ of the 
neighborhood. His opposition to the mood of political oppression and the stringent economic 
policies initiated by Sadat, was first exhibited through his leadership of the student union, a 
position to which he was freely elected by the student body in 1972.
113
 Ahmed ‘Abdallah had led 
the famous student occupation and first ever sit-in in the Gamal Abdel Nasser hall room at the 
Cairo University, which would shortly thereafter develop into massive protests in Tahrir Square 
in January 24.
114
 On the day following the occupation of Tahrir Square, President Anwar Al-
Sadat addressed a speech to the student body, attempting at reconciling with some of their 
demands. Yet, the president remained wary of Abdallah’s influence over the movement and at 
some point in his speech, the president uttered the famous words “I will not sit with Rozza”, 
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ultimately signaling to the powerful resonance of ‘Abdallah’s name as leader of the movement 
and his revolutionary role in shaping the politics of a generation. ‘Abdallah was considered a 
young hero of the neighborhood and his circles of influence grew from within ‘Ain el-Sira. In 
fact, many of those younger students of ‘Abdallah would carry on to manage Al-Geel Center 
after his passing, as will be explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
Other figures from the neighborhood which demonstrate its earlier cultural and social make-up 
include Farag el Antary, who was a musician in the Cairo Orchestra Symphony and was one of 
the artists who grew from within the neighborhood. There was also Mohamed Afifi, who was 
considered a local leader within the community. He was the representative of the Socialist Union 
in Masr el Qadima (of which ‘Ain el Sira is a part of), and later became elected into one of the 
executive committees of the Socialist Union. His opposition to Sadat and his commitment to his 
own Nasserist ideologies had even led to his arrest numerous times and his activism was not only 
recognizable on a local level, but he was also nationally known.
115
 
Contemporary ‘Ain el-Sira however, demonstrates a stark transformation from the social and 
political conditions of the 1970s. As will be explored below, the change in the constituency of 
the neighborhood’s population has had a lot to do with the transformation of the neighborhood 
from a hub for social activists, politicians and artists, to one where religious conservatism, 
political apathy and social conservatism become the main markers of the area. However, they are 
these transformations which trigger questions about the forms of national belonging in a 
community which had seemingly lost its touch with political participation and social activism. 
The following sections will attempt to reveal some of the alternative ways in which national 
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belonging and inclusion within the national project and community can be understood in a 
contemporary working class neighborhood in Cairo. 
History and Modes of Social Organization  
 
’Ain el-Sira enjoys a central urban location. Built on the main road of Salah Salem, ’Ain el-Sira 
lies south of the historic neighborhood of el-Sayyida Zeinab and is separated from the busy 
neighborhood of el-Dokki by the Nile corniche. Built in 1958, ’Ain el-Sira was part of the new 
Public Housing project (PH) introduced by former President Gamal Abdel Nasser. The PH 
projects aimed to provide better housing opportunities to middle and lower class Egyptians, 
through providing rent stabilized housing, thus rendering the neighborhood more affordable to 
larger sections of the population.
116
  
The neighborhood was initially built as two hundred residential blocks, with an average of sixty 
apartment buildings per block.
117
 It also included a designated market area and was renowned for 
an abundance of green zones surroundings its roads and buildings. During Nasser’s rule, the 
neighborhood was supplied with cooperative shops that provided basic goods at subsidized 
prices.
118
 By the late 1960s, additional housing units were constructed by the state to 
accommodate the growing population, which came from within Cairo as well as other Egyptian 
governorates.
119
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Since its inception, ’Ain el-Sira has had a relatively heterogeneous population in terms of the 
geographical, professional and social backgrounds of its residents.
120
 The population contains 
residents from a variety of different rural areas, as well as class positions – including working 
class families, small to medium-sized merchants and middle class professionals, such as school 
teachers and government employees.
121
  
By the time Anwar Sadat came to power, the Egyptian economy was faltering and under great 
pressure to cope with growing global markets. With Sadat’s introduction of the policy of infitah, 
the state-led policies of Nasser were dismantled and the Egyptian market opened up to foreign 
and private investors. The focus of new investors was alternatively directed toward luxurious and 
upper-class housing due to the low profitability of low-income housing projects
122
. In line with 
the state’s gradual retraction from the market, Sadat introduced new housing laws that organized 
the transfer of home ownership from the state to residents, at a symbolic price
123
. There were 
assumed political benefits in offering home ownership to lower income groups through 
privatizing housing. Additionally, the high cost of maintaining the area in comparison to the 
small financial returns from apartment rentals is argued to have geared the decision to privatize 
housing in the neighborhood.
 124
    
Privatizing Residence and the Creation of Local Power Groups in ‘Ain el-Sira 
 
Privatization of apartments was one of the most influential factors in shaping the demographic 
and social divisions of the neighborhood, and allowed many families to sell their apartments in 
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’Ain el-Sira and move to more affluent neighborhoods.  This also took place at a time when 
many Egyptians, including residents of the area, had begun moving abroad, especially to 
countries of the Gulf, as job markets expanded in these regions. As explained by one former 
resident of the neighborhood, Dr. Hassan, who now lives in the upper-middle class neighborhood 
of Maadi, many residents took jobs abroad throughout the 1980s, providing more chances for 
upward mobility and allowing many families to sell their apartments in ’Ain el-Sira and move to 
better neighborhoods. His own family sold their apartment in the late 1980s and moved to the 
middle class district of el-Haram, after his eldest sister started working in Saudi Arabia. The 
extent of this trend was such that, by the late 1980s, one apartment building was seen to have 7 
out of the 10 families residing in it, move to the Gulf 
125
  
The possibility of selling residences also led to changes in the constituency of the neighborhood. 
For example, apartments were being sold to immigrants from other rural governorates, in 
addition to residents from informal settlements around Cairo. Rural immigrants arriving to the 
area also attracted their own kin and family members, resulting in the formation of social 
relations and solidarity bonds among families from the same governorates. As stated by 
numerous residents, these clan-based groups have also been particularly important in the 
consolidation of popular support bases for parliamentary candidates, particularly those running 
with the NDP.  
Not only did the constituency of the neighborhood undergo transformation, but there was also an 
observable increase in the population. The increasing cost of living triggered by Sadat’s Open 
Door policy, combined with the government’s lack of new public housing projects, had 
culminated in a housing crisis which prevented many young adults from leaving their parents’ 
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homes after marriage. As a result, many apartments housed two and sometimes three generations 
of the same family at once. For instance, one apartment that had housed a family of six during 
the 1980s is now home to fourteen people, including three siblings, their wives and children.    
In their study of societal participation in ’Ain el-Sira, Abdallah and Siam — who are also 
residents of the neighborhood — argue that the changes in the constituency of the population of 
’Ain el-Sira also led to a change in the de facto elite of the community.126 The draining of middle 
class professionals from the area created spaces for the recognition of social status along 
references other than that of education and occupational standing. The authors argue that, 
instead, money-making became one of the main indicators of a person’s stature, whereby the 
social status of a kasseeb (one with a skill of quickly making money), became equal to that of a 
professor or doctor.
127
 As will be explored in Chapter 4, money-making opportunities available 
for the kasseeb have, in fact, expanded with the growth of opportunities within the informal job 
market, which has continued to expand with rising levels of consumerism and the expansion of 
the private sector, particularly as the state failed to accommodate the growing population within 
its formal employment structures. The magnitude of the this failure became increasingly obvious 
with the introduction of Mubarak’s neoliberal economic policies, which encouraged private 
businesses and the development of private money-making schemes, many of which grew 
informally and out of the bounds of the law, particularly in low-income neighborhoods.  
Situating Power groups and Notables in ‘Ain el-Sira 
 
The emergence of new power groups within the community is part of the process through which 
local communities shaped their own means of inclusion within the national project. The role of 
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these groups, or notables, as will be explored below, signals to alternative modes of power-
sharing that have been established between residents of the neighborhood and members of the 
ruling elite under Mubarak, further increasing spaces through which locals assimilate as part of a 
national community and within the national polity.   
First, it is important to outline and define the characteristics of these elite power groups. The 
aforementioned values of money-making are important, not only in relation to status but also 
because they shape individuals’ and groups’ capacity for meeting local demands and mediating 
local disputes. These money-making groups are considered the current notables of the 
community and consist of members of old and long-standing families who are often called upon 
to mediate local conflicts.
128
 Their status is not only based on their recognized roles as mediators, 
but also on the kinds of social and economic networks that they are involved in. The ability to 
offer protection to residents, procure material resources, and call on their respective connections 
when needed, have been key features in the survival of such power groups.  
The notables of present-day ’Ain el-Sira are made up of local families who occupy prominent 
positions within different trades in the neighborhood. They include owners of automobile repair 
shops, fruits and vegetable vendors, old coffee shop owners, as well as popular drug dealers. In 
his work on the politics of patronage in Egypt, Mohamed Menza points out continuities between 
these kinds of sociopolitical intermediaries and traditional figures of authority in the old 
Egyptian hara.
129
 These figures of authority, namely the futuwwa, are known for their physical 
strength, bravery, generosity, and most importantly, their intimate and personal ties with 
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residents.
130
 The role of these groups in the social structure of the urban community of ’Ain el-
Sira often falls along this historical continuity of the futuwwa, acting as an alternative to a largely 
inefficient state structure.
131
 More so, in their attempt to minimize the exploitation of the 
authorities and retain control over their spatial and social capital, these groups became engaged 
in economic and political networks which offered them security and freedom in organizing their 
businesses and social relationships. As such, they were often seen to enter into deals and 
agreements with the ruling elite under Mubarak, spanning a wide range of activities that include, 
but are not limited to: working on local campaigns for NDP parliamentary candidates, selling 
votes during parliamentary elections, aiding the police in arresting criminals in the area, as well 
as assuming the role of “peacemakers” in the neighborhood so as to avoid police intervention in 
the first place. This kind of power delegation, argues el-Hagg Yasser, a coffee shop owner who 
is considered one of the notables in the area, was actually welcomed by the local police forces 
under Mubarak.
132
 These groups of residents, as such, were positioned to act as intermediaries 
and facilitators of a range of political, economic and social processes in the neighborhood 
through engaging in relations of cooperation and power exchange with national authorities. 
I argue that these groups, from the kasseeb to the notables, are constitutive of what Asef Bayat 
terms social “non-movements.” These non-movements point to groups who practice an 
“everyday art of presence” through utilizing what is available to them and uncovering new 
spaces within which to be seen, heard and realized within the nation.
133
 The emphasis here is on 
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the possibility of viewing ordinary people as generative forces that can effect meaningful 
changes through everyday actions.
134
 For instance, the notables’ role in steering local political 
and social action becomes particularly visible at times of national transition, such as with the rise 
of the Muslim Brotherhood. The regime change under Mubarak placed residents’ modes of 
inclusion into the national project among new and unfamiliar power groups, causing them to 
question the extent of their inclusion within the Muslim Brotherhood’s nationalist discourse. 
This sense of exclusion was most vividly expressed by power groups such as the notables, whose 
role in mobilizing parts of the community against groups like the Brotherhood, were quite 
significant. 
Groups of residents like the ones discussed here constitute spaces of discursive intermediacy, 
between the politics and needs of the locale and the power structures of national authority. That 
is, the relations created between notables in the area and representatives of the national regime 
are constitutive of spaces in which alternative forms of power sharing and inclusion in the 
national project can be shaped and negotiated. These intermediate relations appear significant in 
the construction of attitudes toward the national regime and the extent to which inclusion within 
it, even if informal, remains possible. Relations with representatives of Mubarak’s regime were 
largely established through notables’ involvement in NDP electoral campaigns. Relations to the 
regime had also been established along more personal ties with omana’ el-shorta (police 
officers) at the local police station, as well as officials within the local municipality. As 
explained by el-Hagg Yasser, a mutual familiarity had been established between members of the 
community and the local police officers. However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ascent to power 
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had brought with it changes within the security personnel dispatches to the area, to the discontent 
of el-Hagg Yasser and other notables in the area. Thus, it is possible to view these spaces of 
discursive intermediacy as those in which citizens are able to negotiate spaces for their inclusion 
in national frameworks of power while ensuring their own interests and needs.  
The basis on which these informal relations are created is not through ideological assimilation 
with governing structures of power, but rather through the existence of spaces of mutual 
recognition and possibilities for differentiated forms of inclusion. Familiarity with and 
recognition of national leaders and their representative bodies is thus constitutive of processes 
through which national belonging can be alternatively experienced and expressed by local 
residents. I argue that these informal spaces are central to our understanding of Egyptian 
nationalism from a micro-scale perspective, and reveal alternative references along which 
inclusion within the national community and national project are constantly recreated within 
everyday life. Establishing a sense of familiarity and a capacity for recognition of the national 
regime appears to manifest within everyday engagements with local state practices. 
Understanding nationalism through residents’ personalized relations with the bodies and 
practices of the national regime is thus useful in analyzing residents’ attitudes toward different 
ruling regimes and the modes through which popular conceptions of national belonging are 
constructed.  
Mapping out the State in ‘Ain el-Sira 
 
Apart from the highly emotive and sensitized forms of nationalist discourse seen during national 
holiday celebrations or expressions of solidarity during national crises, nationalist discourse is 
also continuously and banally recreated on the level of the everyday. This section will discuss the 
ways in which boundaries of the national community and possibilities for recognition within the 
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national project continue to be recreated through citizens’ interactions with the practices and 
personnel of state institutions. 
From the outset, there appears to be scant presence of the state in ’Ain el Sira. The presence of 
the state appears limited to the local police station, one of the important state institutions that acts 
as a space in which residents engage with national authority; the main neighborhood mosque that 
was built during the construction of the neighborhood and which belongs to the Ministry of 
Endowments; and a family hospital that serves as one of important state facilities catering to the 
neighborhood and surrounding areas. The relative absence of the state is evident in the lack of 
public facilities and the increasing degradation of infrastructure beginning the late 1980s, to 
which scant government attention is paid.  
In our conversations, residents consistently listed problems with trash and sewage as the main 
aspects of public life that require attention from the government. ’Ain el-Sira has three public 
schools, one of which is Ahmed Abdel Aziz School. For the duration of fieldwork, the school 
was surrounded by a constant overflow of sewage water and large piles of trash were seen to 
block access to the school’s entrance. Residents argued that the school had been suffering from 
these problems for many years now, and little has been done by the government (including that 
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s) to improve the infrastructure around it. More so, the cooperative 
outlets established during the time of Nasser have ceased to function; their buildings are now 
empty and abandoned. As one resident stated as he sat smoking his hookah at one of the local 
coffee shops, “We’re always forgotten by the government, dropped out of their projects, as you 
can see by the state of our roads and infrastructure.” Another resident argued that the people in 
the neighborhood are forced to do everything themselves, from fixing street electricity to re-
paving roads after they are ruined by sewage floods. The state in ’Ain el-Sira is thus often 
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defined against that which it is not; the areas in which it does not provide and the countless 
instances in which it failed to respond to citizens’ troubles and requests.   
But understanding the presence of the state in the neighborhood cannot be premised on a 
dichotomous understanding of presence and absence. Rather, the apparent absence of the state 
from the neighborhood is alternatively read along two lines. First, there are the expanded 
possibilities for residents to negotiate their economic relations and modes of social organization 
in the locale. The state’s gradual retraction from its role in the provision of basic services and 
infrastructure, law enforcement and maintenance of social order, has culminated in increased 
spaces for residents’ autonomy over public space. For instance, residents were able to open their 
own kiosks, shops and coffee places, most of which operated without permits. Massive building 
extensions were constructed adjunct to the original residential blocks as many families grew 
beyond the capacities of the original apartments. The wide, empty pavements became the 
sanctuary of the ever-growing market that has long overgrown its designated area expanding into 
the streets of the neighborhood. The high degrees of informality, deregulation and privatization 
of space reproduction have become some of the most salient features of ’Ain el-Sira, seen as part 
of a growing neoliberal city.
135
  
The second way of reading the presence of the state in the area is through realizing the 
implication of day-to-day processes of space-making and social organization with the local forms 
of state bureaucracy. Forty percent of the total labor force of Masr el-Qadima belongs to the 
informal sector which continues to depend on informal relations with bodies of the state in 
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organizing their activities and ensuring their survival.
136
 For instance, el-Hagg Yasser states that 
owners of local businesses and coffee shops have opted to forge deals or bribe employees of the 
local municipality as well as officers in the local police station rather than to follow through with 
the endless process of obtaining a legal permit. Despite the greater possibilities for control and 
autonomy over their living quarters and businesses, residents’ continued presence and survival 
depended on processes of power negotiation and on establishing informal relations of familiarity 
and co-dependence with representative bodies of the state. Residents specifically capitalized on 
relations among employees of the state who are routinely present in the neighborhood. Among 
the most important of these state employees, argues el-Hagg Yasser, are the ameen el-shorta and 
the mabahith officers, with whom familiarity develops as they tend to remain in their posts for a 
few years at a time.  
Residents’ expressions of familiarity with the personnel and practices of national institutions 
signals to alternative spaces through which identifications within the nation become 
conceptualized and negotiated on an everyday basis. More so, it is through these daily informal 
interactions and the creation of relations of mutual recognition and familiarity that the form and 
limits of national governance are continuously recreated. These relations are thus seen as 
constitutive of alternative power spaces, through which the struggle for power-sharing and 
inclusion within the national polity take place. It is also through these spaces that the abstract 
values of national inclusion and the imagined limits of the national community become recreated 
in tangible forms on the level of everyday life interactions. 
State Society Relations as Seen through the Role of the Local Municipality 
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One of the important pillars of Mubarak’s regime and that which aided in its survival was its 
dependence on countless interpersonal relationships and local ties between the state and a class 
of citizens made up of intermediaries and middlemen, as mentioned above. Even citizens who 
were not involved in direct relations of patronage with the state had seemingly established an 
understanding of how the state functioned in everyday life. As one resident argued in explaining 
his preference of the old regime over that of the Muslim Brotherhood, “We knew very well the 
ways of Mubarak’s regime; its system, its people and the games they played. And we knew what 
we needed to do to look out for ourselves and meet our needs and the needs of our families.” 
(Gamal; 2015) 
Knowledge of the old regime in this sense entailed a recognizable familiarity with informal 
channels of communication, the possibilities for back-door agreements and, most importantly, 
knowledge of the power groups one could resort to in order to “get things done.” One of the 
important spaces in which recognition and engagement with the national authority took place 
was in the local municipalities, which are known for their exceptionally high levels of corruption 
and chances for discreet profiteering.  
Municipalities in Egypt are intended to act as links between decisions made in central 
government and their application on the local level, as part of a lengthy, yet largely inefficient 
process of decentralization.
137
 Infrastructure works, electricity, sanitation and building permits 
are among the mandate of the municipalities and as such these institutions play a role in steering 
processes of socio-economic development, as well as act as spaces for perpetuating the discourse 
of development adopted by the national authority. Importantly, it is with the advent of Mubarak’s 
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neoliberal phase, amid the growth of opposition against his regime –  particularly from Islamic 
forces – that municipalities became regarded by the regime as fertile spaces for the establishment 
of community-level power bases used to ensure the regime’s own interests.138 Technically, local 
municipalities are controlled by their elected councils, but it was the then-ruling NDP that had 
unilaterally won almost all municipal elections. Even when municipal elections were frozen 
between the years 2003 and 2007, the government had opted to appoint an ad-hoc committee, 
mainly constitutive of NDP members and affiliates.
139
 By the 2008 elections, the NDP had won 
97 percent of all municipal seats.
140
 According to Ahmed Abdallah, a late activist and resident of 
’Ain el-Sira, the importance of municipalities had in fact surpassed that of the parliament and the 
Shura Council, as any electoral candidate from the area had to first pass through the personnel at 
the local municipality.
141
 
However, being severely underfunded and highly limited by dependence on the governor’s 
approvals, local municipalities have continued to receive reduced state allocations, or ones that at 
best remain stagnant, and thus could not possibly match the growing needs of the administration 
or the locale.
142
 Their operations consequently began to take place through informal networks of 
interests, motivated by citizens’ improvisation of new ways of managing their livelihoods and 
aided by the propensity of government workers to operate outside the formal limits of the law. 
This will be explored further through empirical cases in Chapter 4. The point is that interpersonal 
ties and mutually beneficial relations became the channels available for the survival of both 
members of the community, as well as those of the ruling regime. 
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Everyday practices and engagements with the local bureaucracy as the instances referred to 
above show, are first and foremost, critical in our understanding of state/ society relations. That 
is, they force one to shift away from the “imperialism of categories” which allow for the 
conventional and convenient distinction between the two.
143
 The positionality of local residents 
as part of the reproduction of state corruption through their active practices of bribery and 
cronyism as well as officials’ tendency to accept working outside the official parameters of the 
law in order to better sustain control over the neighborhood as well as to further their own 
personal interests, reveals a merger between the two categories of state and civil society on the 
level of everyday life. Not only are financial transactions involved, but the interactions between 
the two reveal another level of inter-personal relations, modes of recognition, informal power 
dynamics and multiple foci for the development of group relations and solidarities. Therefore, in 
focusing on the multiple relations of power at play within these local engagements, it becomes 
possible to locate the discursive construction of the forms and limits of national belonging 
through areas which are often marked off as signifying the “failure” of the state. It is also 
important to become sensitive to the use of corruption discourses, for they must be placed in a 
context of a regime of “development”; that which came into existence as part of the international 
order of decolonized nation states.
144
 This allows us to pose serious questions to the validity and 
usefulness of the exclusive categories of state and civil society which were constructed along 
Western imaginaries of political and social life. What arises therefore, is a need for an 
understanding of the relative positionalities each occupies in terms of the other, particularly 
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realizing the cultural and political processes involved within them, which shape the limits and 
forms of “belonging” and “inclusion” into the national project in an Egyptian working-class 
neighborhood.  
Municipalities are thus situated at the boundaries of both national politics and community 
relations. In other words, their engagement with the day-to-day realities of residents has situated 
these institutions between feelings of detachment from the national sphere and spaces for 
inclusion and assimilation within it. As such, relations formed with and around the local 
municipality are seen as discursive spaces of meaning-making, whereby citizens experience their 
place in the nation and negotiate their positions, even informally, within its power networks. 
Even though high levels of inefficiency and corruption in municipalities left the majority of 
residents frustrated, their role continued to be a generative one. Municipalities’ generative role is 
seen through their shaping of an everyday culture of informality, whereby power sharing and 
inclusion within networks of interest becomes based on locally and historically established 
relations with the personnel and practices of the ruling regime and its interest groups. The 
possibility of regularly “placing” oneself within the regime’s networks of power is part of 
conceptual processes that make possible the recognition of the modes of inclusion within the 
national community.
145
  
Nevertheless, it is particularly these struggles over inclusion and equality, as well as feelings of 
disengagement from the power relations and networks of interest of the state, which have left 
large numbers of citizens frustrated with Mubarak’s national project. The discontent and feelings 
of exclusion of wide sections of the population culminated in mass nationalist upheaval against 
his regime in 2011. A seeming failure of the citizenship contract between the regime and the 
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population, had been identified as one of the motives behind the popular uprising. However, it is 
the assumed limits of such contract which requires our attention. That is, the discourse of 
citizenship rights in the case of residents of ‘Ain el-Sira, remains limited for understanding the 
micro-scale and informal modes of inclusion that have been produced between citizens and the 
state in the neighborhood. Looking beyond the conceptually and analytically limited categories 
of citizenship, it is possible to see the necessary processes for negotiating alternative spaces and 
informal relations for residents to secure their own needs and interests, particularly within a state 
apparatus that remains burdened by a growing population and inefficient governing structure. 
That is, acquiescing to the idea that citizens simply do not enjoy most of their citizenship rights 
certainly overlooks the nuances related to the differences between “entitlement” and 
“empowerment”.146 Utilizing the discourse of citizenship draws an image where residents lack 
their entitled rights. However, in doing so, it also overlooks the local and original processes and 
negotiations- the spaces of local forms of agency- which essentially shape citizens’ efforts at 
securing their needs. Such processes entail a sense of empowerment and agency which are not 
reflected in the discourse on citizenship. 
 However, even groups of residents, such as the notables, who had engineered spaces for 
benefitting from the ruling regime, had hopes for better chances of inclusion after the regime’s 
downfall and many found in the piety of the Muslim Brotherhood sufficient motive to believe 
that their rule would come with more equality and lesser levels of corruption  Also  what is 
important to realize here is the ideological detachment from Mubarak’s regime and its signaling  
to the development of a particular mode of national belonging; one which is premised on an 
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understanding of the nation through its permissibility of informal forms of inclusion; that is, 
relations which are not delimited on citizens’ ideological assimilation with the regime.    
Interestingly so, the relations inherent in the organization of the Muslim Brotherhood also 
predicated their existence along informal and interest-based networks and associations. However, 
it is in understanding the ways in which residents understood and experienced these new power 
bases and their respective positions within them, that local attitudes toward the Muslim 
Brotherhood can be better understood. The case of the Muslim Brotherhood is also fruitful in 
reading the nuances of religiosity and nationalism in Egypt. Therefore, the next few pages will 
discuss some of the conceptual disparities between residents’ internalization and acceptance of 
Islamic modes of piety in everyday life and between their experiences of political Islam as an 
exclusive field of power under the rule of the Brotherhood. 
Contesting Frameworks of Belonging in ‘Ain el-Sira 
 
Residents of ’Ain el-Sira are part of a locale which is not only engaged with the informal 
dynamics of the state, but it is also one that has been part of the piety movement in Egypt. Saba 
Mahmoud views the piety movement as the increase in Islamic forms of observance beginning in 
the 1970s, whereby Islamic references increasingly came to shape and mold everyday social and 
cultural life.
147
 Indeed, it is true that the forces of Islamic conservatism have pervaded the 
majority of aspects of public, as well as private life in Egypt, whereby religious references and 
its authoritative texts have come to occupy normalized spaces within popular discourse. 
Empirically, it is possible to see a surge in the number of mosques throughout Cairo as well as an 
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expansion in the kinds of activities procured within them. Quran recital lessons are the norm as 
part of the daytime activities of mosques, the latter which have also been increasingly used as 
platforms by preachers and Islamic activists to propagate their message and gain followers, 
particularly so in sha’bi, or overpopulated quarters. Religion can also be seen as more 
extensively proliferating through state and non-state educational systems as well as public and 
private media channels. The Islamic veil is popularly endorsed and continues to signal the 
importance of expressing conservatism and piety in the public space. 
It is critical to point out that engagement in the piety movement is not limited to religious groups 
and non-state actors, but that the Egyptian state, since Nasser, had been using religion to 
consolidate power and mobilize society for decades.
148
 With the successive regimes of 
nationalist governance under Sadat, Mubarak and the current presidency of Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, 
religion has been increasingly cast as intertwined with nationalism.
149
 Whether it is through 
linking the values of heroism and sacrifice for the nation, with the highly upheld Islamic value of 
martyrdom, or through state censorship over texts, publications and media productions on 
religious grounds, or even as seen through the tradition of ending each statement from the 
Egyptian Armed Forces with a prayer for success and help from God (wallahu al-mowafiq wa al-
mosta’an), the discourse of Egyptian nationalism had always borrowed from the values and 
legitimacy of Islam, in constructing its own popular image. Therefore, instead of viewing 
religion as constituting counter-codes of civility than those espoused by Egyptian nationalism, it 
ought to be seen as something that is so imbricated with it that it becomes part of the 
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phenomenon of Egyptian nationalism.
150
 Religious values are thus seen as constitutive of modes 
of social organization and identity formation in Egypt. The positionality of religious discourse 
among residents in ’Ain el-Sira is discussed in the following analysis. 
Situating Religious Discourse in ‘Ain el-Sira 
 
The proliferation of religious symbols and modes of religious identification in ’Ain el-Sira can 
be seen through a number of developments in the neighborhood. For instance, according to the 
older residents of the neighborhood, but who continue to visit till the present day, argue that 
there has been a visible increase in the number of mosques in the area. In contrast to the decrepit 
state of residential buildings and public facilities, the mosques were of the few spaces in the 
neighborhood that received attention from residents, Islamic charity groups, as well as from the 
Egyptian state. The state-controlled mosque in ’Ain el-Sira, which belongs to the Ministry of 
Endowments, is routinely maintained and kept in good shape. The new mosques that have been 
built had either been locally funded or constructed by the efforts of Islamic associations. More 
than just a place for prayer, mosques provided religious lessons and acted as spaces for young 
men and women to meet and engage with matters of religion and piety and their place in 
everyday modern life. Mosques, as such, act as spaces in which religio-cultural frames of 
belonging become part of the process of articulation of subjectivities.
151
  
Another particularly subtle symbol of religious identification are the small blue placards placed 
on the entrances of most apartment buildings that appeared in the early 1990s. With the words 
al-Islam howa al-hall (“Islam is the solution”), the Muslim Brotherhood’s slogan repetitively yet 
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subtly appears around the neighborhood. As I have come to learn through discussions with 
residents, most residents were unaware of the context of this slogan prior to the January 25 
revolution and the placards appeared to be just another form of some voluntary effort toward 
furthering the resonance of Islamic teachings through daily reminders. 
Another important Islamic association in the neighborhood that had played a role in 
mainstreaming Islamic references in the neighborhood is that of al-jam’eyya al-shar’eyya (JS). 
Funded through donors from the wealthy countries of the Gulf, the building of the JS mosque 
was built across from the state-owned mosque, in a powerful standoff between the two.
152
 The JS 
offers an extensive program of action that can be divided into da’wa (religious awareness) and 
aid services.
153
 Those include provision of religion classes and lectures, basic food and school 
supplies, day-care center services, free medical aid and discount trips for ‘umra and hajj, to name 
a few.
154
  
Although officially an apolitical, service oriented, non-governmental organization, the JS was 
arguably closely associated with the Muslim Brotherhood.
155
 Links between it and the 
Brotherhood before the revolution, however, were unknown to the majority of residents I spoke 
to, even though the Islamic nature of the JS was recognizable to them. In fact, most residents, old 
and new, report that the presence and popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood had always been 
low in the neighborhood. And although many have engaged with Islamic charities and 
associations of different kinds, the majority of their engagements with these centers were not 
premised on knowledge of, or association with, organized Islamic groups like the Muslim 
Brotherhood. For instance, many of those interviewed had expressed their preference in dealing 
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with the JS in order to address their daily needs and concerns, mainly because they were more 
efficient in their services and conveniently located close to their residence, rather than because of 
political or ideological links with the organization. It is true that the combination of Islamic 
discourse with that of local development and aid had indeed helped in garnering moral 
legitimacy to these kinds of Islamic associations. However, the point here is to emphasize the 
relatively depoliticized nature of engagements with Islamic associations as experienced by 
residents of the neighborhood.  
The extent to which contending Islamic forces, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, have been able 
to successfully gain the support and mobilize residents of the working class neighborhood of 
’Ain el-Sira ought to be read in light of the spaces of power sharing and inclusion imagined by 
residents under the new regime. As mentioned above, although a conservative community that is 
imbricated in the propagation of Islamic modes of civility, ordinary residents’ relations to 
organized political Islamic groups seem to have been limited. This largely seems to have been 
due to lack of knowledge about groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and their political history, 
which many only became aware of after the January 25 revolution. This is a significant factor 
that points to the lack of presence of the Muslim Brotherhood as an ideological popular 
movement in the neighborhood. The Muslim Brotherhood and their networks of relations did not 
seem to be a part of residents’ daily social, political and economic engagements, nor were they 
part of the interest groups and power relations that have been established over the years in the 
neighborhood.  
As such, two points need to be made about the position of the Muslim Brotherhood within 
Egyptian nationalist discourse. An ideological movement in the first instance, the rise of the 
Muslim Brotherhood to power brought with it new and contending power relations, whilst 
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framing the question of national identity within a specific and clearly delineated ideological 
framework. That is, ideological assimilation was experienced as a prerequisite to inclusion 
within the new regime’s modes of power-sharing. As discussed in the previous chapter, the 
power of ideologies as mobilizing nationalist forces greatly differed among rulers, and mainly 
depended on the social and political popularity of its advocates and proponents. This brings us to 
the second point: the idea that the networks and groups of power within which the Islamic 
organization operated were experienced as part of distinctly different and as such, “unpatriotic” 
circles, as explored through residents’ anecdotes in the next chapter. The identity of the new 
rulers thus appeared to fall outside the nationalist claim to shared identity and equal inclusion. 
The bases on which inclusion and belonging were conceptualized under the Muslim Brotherhood 
seemed more limited and exclusionary, especially when compared to the fluidity of personal 
relations through which inclusion and power-sharing could be negotiated under Mubarak, where 
ideological assimilation was not required. Therefore, in order to situate the relationship 
constructed between national belonging and Islam in ’Ain el-Sira, it is critical to differentiate 
between the place of Islam in residents’ everyday lives, in contrast to the ways in which it was 
presented by the Muslim Brotherhood, as an exclusive field of power.  
Conclusion  
The advent of the January 25 revolution has brought issues of national identity, political Islam 
and opportunities for representation between them, to the fore. However, as noted in discussions 
with residents, the neighborhood of ’Ain el Sira had been relatively uninvolved in the protests. 
As Saeed, a senior worker in a car repair shop, argued, “The time of the events of the revolution 
was a very uncertain time for us, even though most of us welcomed the fall of Mubarak’s corrupt 
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regime. We had hopes for things to change for the better but none of the people I know joined in 
the protests.”156  
The relative disinterest expressed by residents toward political participation is not surprising 
given their general detachment from ideological politics and formal political participation. As 
Bayat argues about non-movements in neoliberal cities, “Non-movements [are] concerned more 
with practice than protest, [oriented] toward action rather than being ideologically driven.”  
Therefore, this chapter focused on the specificities of social organization and some of the 
everyday practices of the “non-movements” in ’Ain el-Sira. In doing so, it sheds light on some of 
the banal spaces through which popular constructions of national belonging and inclusion 
develop in one of Cairo’s working class urban neighborhoods. In doing so, banal everyday 
interactions become situated as discursive spaces through which citizens come to recognize, as 
well as re-organize, the limits of inclusion in the national community and their positions within 
its power bases. Interactions and familiarity with local state personnel act as some of these 
popular banal spaces, highlighting the informal and individualized power relations that have 
developed among national authorities and citizens of the community as a mode of recognition 
within the national project.  
This chapter has also argued for a differentiation between religion as a normality in residents’ 
everyday lives, and between experiencing it as an exclusive field of power under the Muslim 
Brotherhood. The positionality of the Muslim Brotherhood within the discourse of national 
belonging in the neighborhood was observed through two aspects. First, the general level of 
ignorance regarding the existence of the organization and its power as a contending political 
force prior to the January 25 revolution has allowed some of its affiliate institutions to exist 
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without much resistance. As such, it seemed that little or no ideological attachments with the 
organization seemed to have existed among residents during that period prior to the January 25 
revolution. 
In addition, and this is the second aspect, the absence of familiarity and networks of interest 
among residents and the power bases of the Muslim Brotherhood have further complicated the 
latter’s integration in the community. The Muslim Brotherhood’s absence from local forms of 
social organization and networks of interest in the community has situated them as foreign and 
unfamiliar groups, threatening already-established channels of power-sharing and cooperation. 
More so, their religious narrative lost its mobilizing resonance as it came into contact with local 
forms of social organization and local power groups. Therefore, informal power relations and the 
differentiated modes of inclusion into the national project, becomes the focus of understanding 
the limits of Muslim rule in ’Ain el-Sira.  
Informal power relations are critical in understanding the differentiated channels through which 
sentiments of national belonging and inclusiveness within the national project become 
constructed through local everyday interactions. The next chapter will explore, through 
residents’ anecdotes, some of the ways in which residents formulated their positions toward the 
Muslim Brotherhood as they engaged in local power struggles over inclusion and equality within 
the new national project. 
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Negotiating the limits of Nationalism under the Muslim Brotherhood’s Rule: Voices from ‘Ain 
El-Sira 
 
Ain Al Sira’s public life is the main focus of this chapter. Public life in this work is imagined as 
a conceptual category that would aid in capturing conceptions of belonging in their fleeting and 
incorporeal forms.
157
 Public life in our case encompasses residents’ interactions with one another 
and with bodies of the state. By focusing on the nature of relations created among members of 
the community, it becomes possible to delineate instances in which residents negotiate the limits 
of inclusion and belonging in the neighborhood. Additionally, relations created between 
residents and bodies of the state reveal some of the spaces in which inclusion in the national 
project and recognition of the national authority, is negotiated and expressed on the local level. 
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This chapter specifically focuses on residents’ experiences with the local practices of the Muslim 
Brotherhood during their year-long rule. Residents’ engagement with the practices of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, reveal discursive spaces in which impressions of the new national leader and his 
nationalist discourse, become constructed on multiple references, other than religion. More so, 
residents’ increasing opposition to the rule of the new Islamic authority, is analyzed as part of the 
creative processes of imagining the nation, constructing the limits of national belonging from a 
local perspective. The discussion thus moves away from positing nationalism against religion 
and instead attempts to deconstruct the references along which modes of national belonging are 
negotiated and experienced within social relations operating at the level of everyday public life. 
The chapter will begin with an interview with one resident of ‘Ain el-Sira, whose views make 
clear some of the nuances and references along which nationalism is conceptualized.  
 
Understanding Residents’ Conceptions of the State and the Nation 
 
Rasha, a  28 year-old volunteer at the center whom I’ve met during the time I spent  there is also 
is also a  schoolteacher She talks about her understanding of nationalism and the references 
according to which ‘belonging’ to the nation is expressed. Her words serve as a line of thought to 
be followed in capturing the ‘how’ of national belonging for some residents of the area. When 
asked what the term wataniyya -meaning  nationalism- meant to her,  Rasha argues that 
“nationalism is difficult to decipher, as different people, some of which she may consider to be 
corrupt and self-interested national figures, identify themselves as nationalists as much as do 
revolutionary and opposition figures”158. She argues that nationalism has less to do with the 
abstract idea of the nation, and more to do with the people that reside in it and the things they do 
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to better their country. “What is Egypt without its people?” She asks. “Egypt lies not in the 
sentiments one has towards its symbolic events and historical structures, such as the Pyramids of 
Giza or the 1973 war”. Her imagination of Egypt is rather implicated with its people; the 
community which makes it up. Additionally, Rasha’s words expose an overlapping of two 
concepts; those of nation and state. She asserts that it becomes difficult to discuss national 
sentiments, when the contours of the state are yet to be defined. For her, nationalism can only 
flourish and become discernible when the state makes itself apparent through provision of 
services, be them security-related, medical, infrastructural or educational. She states that it is 
because of the lack of these provisions that so many young people have lost faith in their nation 
and opted to move abroad and move elsewhere. She argues that the absence of the basic role of 
the state, which is to protect and provide for its citizens, makes it farcical to speak of national 
sentiments.  
 Although Rasha’s words may evoke resonance with the discourse of citizenship; that is 
citizenship entitlements which range from economic security to the right of political 
participation, as well as individual rights of speech, faith and property, it is important to point out 
some of the variations and expansions to the discourse of citizenship in this study.
159
 That is, 
instead of limiting our understanding of residents’ notions of belonging to that of citizenship 
practices, this work aims to expand the parameters of this conceptualization to go beyond the 
western-oriented categories of the citizenship discourse. The point is rather to expand the issues 
of inclusion and belonging to include the micro-scale, often invisible processes which make 
possible the attainment of rights and needs within a faltering welfare system. That is, acquiescing 
to the idea that residents simply do not enjoy most of their citizenship rights certainly overlooks 
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the nuances related to the differences between “entitlement” and “empowerment”.160 Utilizing 
the discourse of citizenship in the case of ‘Ain el-Sira draws an image where residents lack their 
entitled rights. However, in doing so, it also overlooks the local and original processes and 
negotiations - the spaces of local forms of agency - which essentially shape residents’ efforts at 
securing their needs. Such processes entail a sense of empowerment and agency which are not 
reflected in the discourse on citizenship. More so, the idea of citizenship becomes more 
complicated in a non-democratic setting, particularly in Egypt where the terms of the social 
contract between state and citizens has continued to falter, particularly during Mubarak’s thirty 
years rule and as such, the parameters of citizenship entitlements appear to vary along time and 
across social classes and locales, becoming more arbitrary and subjective. Although citizenship 
discourses may be useful in understanding and expressing the status of members of a local 
community, this work argues for a broader articulation of the processes which make possible the 
attainment or loss of citizenship rights, those which are intricately related to an understanding of 
the local and informal relations established between members of the community and the ruling 
regime. 
 
Rasha’s words are particularly telling of the neo-liberal economic policies that have been 
introduced under Mubarak, which signaled the retraction of the state from the market, but also 
coupled with an inefficient and over-burdened bureaucracy and state resources, leading to mass 
discontent over the performance of Mubarak’s government. But Rasha’s words are also telling of 
some of the ways in which the nation (El watan) and the state (El dawla) can be read in terms of 
one another. In one way, her words express an intrinsic link between the two, whereby the efforts 
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of the state are seen as the main building blocks for any sentiments of patriotism or nationalism 
to flourish. Other romanticized or emotive expressions of national sentiment, she argues, are 
empty expressions, void of any real affect. As such, her understanding of nationalism hinges on 
the performative aspects of statehood and governance. That is, the ways in which the state 
performs on an everyday level in securing the needs of its population, That is, not only does 
Rasha express a dismissal of romanticized images of the nation, but she also links notions of 
national belonging to the more mundane, day-to-day interactions with the many faces of the 
state, such as through the provision of different service including maintaining security in the area 
and responding to citizens’ complaints and day to day livelihood problems.  
Rasha’s words however, also reflect a sentiment of detachment from the efforts of the state, as 
something that she does not experience or enjoy in her everyday life, and something she can do 
little to effect. It becomes a problematic that lies outside her reach and control, yet one that 
infiltrates her personal undertakings in the most powerful ways. It is within the spaces between 
her own understandings of the nation and her daily experiences within it, that Rasha locates 
discursive spaces in which the nation is constructed. Her words allows for a shift away from 
macro-view analyses that focus largely on the political sphere of nationalism. In her book, Faces 
of the State, Yael Navaro-Yashin argues that the sphere of national politics has already been 
repeatedly critiqued by everyday citizens. That is, processes of political critique and 
deconstruction should no longer be seen as the job of politicians and intellectuals. The seeming 
result is that the ‘political’ continues to exist, surviving its own deconstruction, and so it 
becomes more useful to focus on different levels of analyses for understanding citizens’ 
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constructions of nationalism and the nation, specifically through understanding negotiations 
around power disparities operating on the level of everyday state-society practices.
161
  
Situating Political Ideologies in the Neighborhood 
 
The conceptual framework from which Rasha speaks appears to be distant and detached from 
any identifiable political ideology. Her work with Al Geel center (to which we will shortly turn) 
has allowed her to engage with many of the intellectuals, artists and activists that frequent it, 
exposing her to numerous political debates and the wide array of individual opinions that become 
discernable within them. However, Rasha’s position as resident of the neighborhood as well as 
worker in the center gives her a unique position. That is, she is part of both spaces in which the 
nation is experienced through daily struggles, and one in which it is discussed as a more abstract 
object of debate. On speaking with her about her own ideological orientation, Rasha clearly 
demonstrates a conscious disassociation with any specific political ideologies. She describes 
political ideologies such as liberalism as imported from the west, ineffectual, sometimes harmful, 
when dealing with the troubles of Egyptian society. She also argues that the stunted growth of 
the socialist movement in Egypt is due to the radicalness of its members and their detachment 
from the real needs of society, arguing that their methods are irrelevant to the needs of the 
Egyptian people.
162
 However, Rasha proceeds to express her desire in seeing a “truly Egyptian” 
ideology and a “truly Egyptian” political party that can sustain it, one that can encompass the 
nature of the Egyptian people and help bring them together, rather than divide them. “We need 
something that has the freedom values of liberalism”, she says, “but with a respect to the basic 
Islamic values of society. We could use the values of equality in socialism but by seeing what the 
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people really need.”163 Rasha’s description of ideology emanates from her position as resident of 
the neighborhood and as such, it is a description implicated in the specific material and moral 
needs of her own community. Her position does not entail a break away from the discourse of 
political ideologies in their totality, she rather re-situates their frames of meaning through local 
understandings of the role of the state. Ideology becomes imagined, not as emanating from a 
loyalty to certain universal principles or values, but rather as a necessary governing framework 
for local Egyptian needs and aspirations. The majority of residents I spoke with also harbored 
feelings of indifference towards subscribing to any of the political ideologies mentioned above. 
Their impressions of political parties were largely negative and many disregarded the idea of 
joining as pointless, and irrelevant to their needs. Residents’ lack of concern with politico-
ideological loyalties however, bring into view alternative references for the creation of 
nationalist loyalties and the construction of national subjectivities. That is, the space of the 
“political” becomes broader and more fluid, allowing everyday mundane acts to be seen as 
generative mobilizing forces. The task at hand therefore entails a process of “tracing the 
political” through discursive acts of meaning-making, rather than situating it in one or multiple 
domains.
 164
  
The following sections will explore some of the sites through which varying associations with 
the national authority are constructed. These spaces uncover power relations that are central to 
residents’ understandings of inclusion within the national project and among the national 
community. Residents’ attitudes towards the authority of the Muslim Brotherhood is seen as an 
example of the fluid processes of identity formation and national belonging that takes place 
through everyday community life. They also signal to the different references along which 
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residents engage the politics of nationalism at times of transitions, such as during and after the 
twelve months in which the Muslim Brotherhood were in power. The influence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the neighborhood is first analyzed through its interactions with Al Geel center, 
demonstrating ways in which frustration with the Brotherhood’s rule had simultaneously been 
expressed through a reaffirmation of local social relations and residents’ belonging to other 
modes of power and social and political collectivities.    
The case of Markaz Al Geel: Creating and Shaping Local Community 
 
Al Geel Youth Center, (meaning center of the Generation) was established in 1994 by the late 
Ahmed Abdallah Rozza, a popular activist and resident of the neighborhood. The acclaimed 
leftist is considered a ‘son’ of the neighborhood. His role and legacy in leading the student 
movement of the 70s and 80s is recalled by all those who know him. One of ‘Abdallah’s life-
long goals had been to increase the spaces available for the inclusion and participation of 
Egyptian youth and young adults in political and cultural life. The center was thus established as 
an educational and research center where children and young adults from the neighborhood 
could learn new skills, explore their individual hobbies and potentials, and can access alternative 
spaces of knowledge through the center’s library which continues to harbor diverse Arabic 
novels and publications. Acting as the cultural, artistic and political hub of the neighborhood of 
Al Geel center will be explored through its acting as a space of identity struggles as the Muslim 
Brotherhood gained control over it.  
The way in which Al Geel performs its role within the neighborhood does not include providing 
materially for residents. One of the reasons behind this is the scarcity of consistent funding. 
Consequently, the center has always run on members donations. Additionally, Abdallah’s vision 
rested in differentiating between the cultural activities of Al Geel and between those charitable 
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institutions whose role is limited to short term material aid to impoverished families of the 
neighborhood. However, Al Geel’s dissociation from the popular activities of charity has meant 
that a cultural research center like this one becomes faced with the difficulty of attracting and 
maintaining solid members and a social following. Yet, despite these hardships, Al Geel has 
continued to exist for the last 20 years. The center had been under ‘Abdallah’s direct 
management since its establishment in 1994 and until his death in 2006, though this does not 
mean that he unilaterally ran the space. As explained by Ayman, a 30 year-old resident in ‘Ain 
Al Sira, a political activist and volunteer at the center, that it is perhaps due to ‘Abdallah’s 
beliefs in shared management, and his delegation of responsibilities and tasks that the center 
managed to survive following his departure.
165
  Focusing his efforts on the children and youth of 
the neighborhood, the center became a popular space for them to meet especially during national 
holidays and religious events such as the month of Ramadan when group iftars and performances 
are held by the center. In many ways, the center shaped up as a space for imagining alternative 
modes of “being” in public life. ‘Abdallah’s mission was focused on providing young adults with 
the necessary leadership skills to help them in their own individual paths
166
. In fact, many of 
those who carried on running the space are residents from ‘Ain el Sira who grew up learning at 
the center. That is, over time, Al Geel had managed to create a community around it, fostering 
friendly ties with residents and neighbors, cementing its presence as a familiar part of the locality 
of ‘Ain Al Sira.  
 In her work in Al Zawya Al Hamra, Farha Ghannam describes the familiarity between residents 
of a specific locality as often helpful in procuring and safeguarding social capital, which to its 
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end, facilitates mutual understanding as well as the formation of social relationships.
167
 During a 
talk with Al Hagg Yasser, son of the owner of the ‘ahwa that one must pass by to get to the 
entrance to the center, he mentions that those working in the center are ‘ahl el mante’a (meaning 
historically belonging to the neighborhood), and are well known to the people. Al Hagg Yasser’s 
position within the power relations of the neighborhood are important to our understanding of the 
survival of the center as it becomes controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood. Al Hagg Yasser’s 
family are fish tradesmen and they established their kar (their career or occupation) thirty five 
years ago in ‘Ain el-Sira. But now his and his father’s kar is this coffee shop, which is one of the 
oldest and biggest in the area, built twenty years ago. His uncle is also one of the most famous 
drug dealers in the neighborhood, and he is regarded as a powerful and well-connected man. El 
Hagg Yasser’s family enjoys significant weight in the neighborhood, given their occupational 
positions and the networks of relations they have constructed along the years. In explaining his 
attitude towards the center, Al Hagg Yasser explains his father was a good friend with the late 
‘Abdallah and that everyone at the coffee shop are on good terms with the people working there. 
“Even those visitors who come to the center”, he says, “are treated as if they belong to the place, 
because we know what kind of people they are and who they’re coming to visit.”168 Merchants 
and residents living around the center have grown familiar with those who work there and 
frequent it, and rarely does one witness feuds or disagreements among them. It is possible to see 
from conversations with residents the importance of gaining knowledge on others, as it enables 
them to best “place” one another.169  Perhaps it is this familiarity and amicability with residents 
of the neighborhood, particularly with the local notables such as Al-Hagg Yasser’s family, which 
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had secured the center’s position in the area. This idea of gaining knowledge about others will 
also prove to be central in understanding residents’ reactions to the increased presence of the 
Muslim Brotherhood in other locations in the neighborhood.  
Al-Geel Center between the State and the Nation 
 
The spaces of Al Geel center had been rented out from Gam’iyyit tanmiyit el mogtama’ (The 
Association for Community Development), which is a state-owned charity institution in ‘Ain Al 
Sira. Residents’ discussions of the center always entailed an emphasis on its link with the 
Association for Community Development. This kind of association had seemingly furthered a 
sense of familiarity and legitimacy for the center’s presence in the area. It is clear from 
discussions that associating the center with one of the representative bodies of the state helps in 
giving it more legitimacy, allowing its presence to be viewed as unthreatening.  Many also 
relayed that they feel they can always resort to the Association for Community development- 
whose building is right next to the center’s- in the incident that troubles from the center may 
arise
170
. Antagonism between residents and members of the center however, had never taken 
place until the Muslim Brotherhood took control of the space, an incident to which we will 
shortly turn. It is important to note however, that the center did not follow a statist agenda, its 
owner a revolutionary figure and highly critical of many aspects of the governing regime and the 
center’s library harbored numerous analytically critical publications on social and political issues 
in the country. The center did however, embrace a clear nationalist identity, as per the nationalist 
orientation of its owner Ahmed ‘Abdallah and in the sense that its efforts were constantly 
expressed as geared towards the advancement of the future generations of the nation. Educating 
children in the history of Egyptian music, theatre and literature, the center often hosted poetry 
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recitals and music performances adapted from the productions of Salah Jaheen and Sayyid 
Mekkawi, two of Egypt’s most popular artists, known for their composition of nationalist songs 
and poetry, as well as their own involvement in the political debates and national events under 
Nasser 
171
  The networks of relations implicated around Al Geel allow us to see the identity lines 
along which the center continued to operate. The political developments that took place in the 
center during Mohammed Morsi’s presidency bring such nuances to the fore. 
 
Changes in the Management of Al Geel 
 
In order to better situate the ways in which residents experience and express lines of social- as 
well as national- belonging, it is best to take a look at one particular incident that has taken place 
during the Muslim Brotherhood’s assuming of power in 2012. After ‘Abdallah’s death, 
ownership of the center was first passed on to his mother in 2006, making her the legal owner of 
the space. Active about maintaining ‘Abdallah’s legacy and in furthering his message, ‘Om 
Ahmed ensured that the place remained open and in operation through closely keeping up with 
‘Abdallah’s friends, colleagues and students; those who were actively involved in operating the 
space. In fact, the center successfully maintained its activities in the years in which she had 
lived.
172
 It was after the death of ‘Abdallah’s mother that legal ownership of the center was 
passed on to his nephew, Nabil. Known for his religious views, Nabil’s influence over the center 
would become more apparent as the Muslim Brotherhood rose to power in Egypt in June 2012. 
Both a member of the Brotherhood and enjoying legal rights in the center, Nabil was able to 
make changes regarding the nature of activities provided by the center. According to Reda, one 
                                                          
171
 Enter information on Salah Jaheen and Sayyid Mekkawi.  
172
 Interview with Omar and Reda 
99 
 
of those most active members in maintaining and running the space and a close friend and 
student of the late ‘Abdallah, the changes that took place in the center in the year the Muslim 
Brotherhood assumed power, were catastrophic and quite radically different from Abdallah’s 
vision. For instance, cultural and artistic activities came to an almost complete halt. According to 
stories told by members, Nabil had never been involved with the center, nor with the people 
running it before ‘Abdallah’s death. He had objected to most of the activities curated by the 
center as they fell outside his own ethical and moral views. Mixed-gender activities were halted, 
and the center began to operate with a focus on charitable activities. All in all, Nabil’s approach 
to community development was religiously and politically driven. He gave access to the space to 
groups who would have never, and did not, subscribe to the late ‘Abdallah’s vision of youth 
empowerment and who found the space better utilized in other ways. For instance, it was 
discovered that Nabil had been allowing members of the Muslim Brotherhood, among groups 
from other charitable organizations, full use of the space to carry out personal meetings or to use 
for other operations such as giving out food supplies 
173
 These activities were seen by 
‘Abdallah’s colleagues, as a way for the Muslim Brotherhood to establish a better footing and 
following in the neighborhood.
174
 And in a complete dismissal of its founder’s legacy, a large-
sized banner carrying a new name for the center, was put up, ignoring the fact that the center 
already had a name. These changes were noticed by local residents who identified the new 
management as part of groups that they had no connections with. Lack of proper management on 
behalf of those originally running the place, have in part, allowed for the take-over of the center. 
But it was also that this kind of radical and flagrant take-over was unexpected, says Reda, and 
the short-lived take-over was possible through gradual infiltration.   
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The Muslim Brotherhood’s abrasive take-over of Al Geel center had in fact mobilized some of 
the local residents, headed by Al-Hagg Yasser’s family, against them, culminating in an attack 
on the center two months before the June 30
th
 protests took over the nation. After a false rumor 
had somehow spread that members of the Brotherhood were storing weapons in the center, 
neighborhood residents took it upon themselves to chase the Brotherhood out of the space. And 
even after realizing there was no truth to the circulating rumor, many insisted on their stances, 
and in fact members of the Brotherhood were physically and aggressively driven out of the 
center and have not attempted a return since. This incident eludes to the centrality of the forces 
of knowledge and familiarity among residents in the neighborhoods and the extent to which the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s presence in the area was implicated in already-existing local power 
relations and social structures. The exclusionary practices of the Brotherhood as seen by their 
way of running the center are only one of the ways in which their presence had set in motion 
local rejections of their rule, setting in motion nationalist demands for the take-over of the 
Military.  
Situating the Muslim Brotherhood: Voices from the Neighborhood 
 
The appearance of the Muslim Brotherhood as the official political authority in June 2012 had 
brought with it debates about the modes of national loyalty that a religious organization would 
bring to its practice of power. The more frequent and nuanced usages of the language of political 
Islam by the Muslim Brotherhood, brought into view the ways in which they positioned 
themselves within the nationalist discourse.  At one point during my fieldwork, one of the 
residents spoke of his aversion against the Muslim Brotherhood by arguing that they resembled a 
different tayfa (sect or denomination) than the rest of Egyptians. Another worker at the coffee 
shop, Hamed, recalled the violent break-up of a peaceful sit-in in front of the ittihadiya palace on 
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the fifth of December, 2012, commenting on the use of violence against peaceful protestors, he 
said that with the brotherhood, mane’rafsh akherhom eh, meaning we do not know to which 
lengths the Brotherhood may go in clamping down on the people
175
. The lack of conceivable 
limits to state power due to lack of familiarity with the Muslim Brotherhood, created an 
imaginary where social life under the brotherhood’s rule, was risky and unpredictable, as it 
remained within the realms of the unfamiliar, yet one which has also been disclosed as prone to 
the use of violence and oppression. Another resident argued that the brotherhood was after what 
was best for its “people”, what he called maslahet el gama’a. In his reference to al-gama’a, he 
was pointing to the heads and leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as to the broader social 
groups that are loyal to it, and identify with it.  These groups are simultaneously acknowledged 
and identified by the Muslim Brotherhood as ‘of them’, or belonging to them. In his public 
speeches, Mohammed Morsi did not hesitate to repeatedly use the words ahli wa ‘asheerati176, in 
addressing the people, or what seemed to be, the Muslim Brotherhood’s supporters. The national 
discourse of the Muslim Brotherhood, experienced through Morsi’s public speeches and 
statements made by members of the organization about silencing all forms of opposition to the 
Muslim Brotherhood, had exposed the Egyptian public to what was experienced, as a powerful 
exclusionary discourse, one which set the Muslim Brotherhood apart from the national 
community. For many residents, it appeared that the Muslim Brotherhood’s interests lay outside 
of their own social circles and local power relations, and were geared instead towards the groups 
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and constituencies that have pledged loyalty to the organization. Groups which residents were 
not a part of, as we will see examples of.   
Constructing Community Boundaries: The Politics of Recognition 
 
 Residents of the neighborhood imagine themselves to be part of social orders and networks of 
belonging that gradually became more visibly different from that of the Brotherhood’s. For 
example, Rasha argues that the politics and social norms of the neighborhood were not 
influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood’s coming to power. Ihna ‘andina nezamna, “we have our 
own order”, she argued, and no outsider can enforce their own rules onto the residents of the 
neighborhood.
177
 Describing the Muslim Brotherhood as “outsiders” entails a framing of the 
organization as one which does not share the same modes of belonging with residents and whose 
existence as part of the social structure of the area is weak. She continues to argue that residents 
living in nearby quarters have grown familiar with one another, and can easily spot outsiders and 
changes in the behavior of their neighbors. She describes groups of young men from the 
neighborhood that had quickly converted to following the Muslim Brotherhood after their 
victory; growing their beards, attending their rallies, and generally expressing support to them. 
Many of those were considered “opportunist supporters” by residents of the neighborhood and 
their transformation was not taken seriously by people. They were often even laughed at and 
made a mockery of.
178
 The politics of recognition within the neighborhood are of important 
analytical value as they set the limits for the influence of emerging power groups as they become 
understood along the references of local familiarity and recognition specific to the locale. 
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Locality, as Arjun Appadurai reminds us, is an inherently fragile social achievement.
179
 Locality 
in this sense, “is a structure of feeling, a material reality and an attachment to a particular 
community” (Singerman, Ammar, 2006; 253). It is about physical and emotional processes that 
must be recreated and reinforced in everyday life. The politics of recognition, as such, are to be 
seen as the creative and generative political forces of the locale.   
I argue that precisely these spaces of recognition are of a significant importance in turning 
respondents from the neighborhood against the rule of the Muslim Brotherhood. As many 
respondents mentioned -in what appeared to be common knowledge- that a number of the 
“thugs” that were used by the Muslim Brotherhood in the violent break-up of the presidential 
palace sit in on December 5
th
, were residents of ‘Ain Al Sira.180 “We recognized them when we 
saw them on television,” explains Amin, a regular at the ahwa. “Some of those thugs are 
convicts and known in the area. We even just learned that one of them has been sentenced to two 
years in prison”.181 Amin proceeded to state that “we understood what kind of people the Muslim 
Brotherhood was recruiting; convicts, and poor people that could be bought off by material 
promises”.  
 The social groups which were seen as supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood, had been drawn 
out, recognized and framed by residents, as “others”; be them criminals, convicts, bought-out 
religious men, extremists or power-hungry politicians. Through residents’ words, it becomes 
possible to see how the Brotherhood itself had been externalized as a body of authority that was 
seen as operating within different interest groups and relations of power; uninterested in an 
inclusive nationalism. Escalating feelings of foreignness to the Muslim Brotherhood, residents’ 
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externalization from its political community and base of supporters, also obscured potentials for 
creating relations with the organization. This is the next point to which we will turn. 
Understanding Changing Attitudes towards the Muslim Brotherhood 
 
The ascendance of the Muslim Brotherhood to power was differently received at different times. 
In the period during the parliamentary elections of 2012, many residents in the area were ready 
to support candidates of the FJP. Mohamed, 27, a resident of ‘Ain Al Sira, argues that most of 
the people in the neighborhood were eager to give their votes to the Freedom and Justice Party 
(FJP). We thought their religiosity and iltizam could bring better chances for pious 
governance.
182
  Members and campaigners appeared in the neighborhood and began offering 
ways to help people, especially the poorer families in the neighborhood, often by providing them 
with money and food rations
183
 Hagg Yasser explains that him and his wife used to love 
watching preacher Sobhi Saleh
184
 speak on his talk show before the Muslim Brotherhood 
“became known”185. He also says that he used to advise his family members and friends to vote 
for the FJP during the parliamentary elections of 2012. He proceeds to comment however, that 
himself and others, were unaware that the FJP and the Muslim Brotherhood represented two 
sides of the same coin. “We did not know they were the same thing” says Hagg Yasser. And 
many of the poor and illiterate residents here had the same impression when the Islamic group 
first started coming to campaign in the neighborhood. Through powerful media campaigns, the 
Muslim Brotherhood became increasingly framed as an organization that was intending on social 
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and political projects detrimental to the security of the Egyptian nation. On realizing that their 
religious identity was linked to a much more politicized organization, many residents became 
weary of the politics of the Brotherhood. Television sensation, Tawfik Okhasha, was cited by 
Hagg Yasser as one of the people that had “awoken” him and his family to the dangers of the 
Muslim Brotherhood, but he argues that they were also able to see their tactics first hand in their 
own circles.
186
 The fall in the appeal of the Brotherhood is described by respondents through a 
number of personal incidents taking place at the level of the everyday.  
Processes of Exclusion 
 
On asking him what made him feel antagonized by the Muslim Brotherhood, Hagg Yasser 
proceeds to describe the incident of the state-owned bakery down the street that came to be 
controlled by the Muslim Brotherhood, catering to the needs of members of the organization. 
“The Minister of Internal Trade at the time, was himself a member of the Brotherhood”, says 
Hagg Yasser, and he had ordered that 5000 loaves of bread to be taken to the offices of the FJP 
every morning, to be distributed to members of the organization.
187
 Hagg Yasser’s narrative did 
not differ from those told by other respondents, such as workshop owners and coffee shop 
visitors, when asked about the operations of the neighborhood bakery. Others recalled that the 
same was being done in the butane gas cylinder warehouse in the neighborhood, amidst a nation-
wide energy distribution crisis. More so, Wael, 30, a regular at the coffee shop, recalled how he 
had been forced to leave the company in which he has worked for eight years, when the Muslim 
brotherhood came to power and bought shares into it. His and others’ dismissal was to make 
room for new appointments from within the Brotherhood.
188
  Residents’ stories show one of the 
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ways in which members of the community experienced externalization from the interests and 
power networks of the Muslim Brotherhood. Their exclusion from the Brotherhood’s social and 
political community was also directly affecting their daily livelihoods.  
The changes in attitudes towards the Muslim Brotherhood are telling. First, they show that the 
significance of religiosity, as a value in and of itself, does not continue to supersede all other 
identity markers, but one that changes according to local needs. The advantage enjoyed by the 
Muslim Brotherhood due to their self-acclaimed religiosity and piety, gradually waned as 
residents increasingly engaged with the local practices of the new regime, which were 
experienced as exclusionary and unequal. The appeal of the Muslim Brotherhood based on its 
upholding of religious values did not in fact, ensure its survival, as religion continued to occupy 
normalized spaces in popular and national discourse independent from the body of the 
Brotherhood. In her work on the politics of conservatism in Egypt, Egyptian sociologist Hania 
Sholkamy describes the public life of religion in Egypt as having seeped into everyday modes of 
governmentality and subject-making. Egyptian media for instance, shows no shortage of 
religious content, no president came to power who did not publicly and systematically use 
religious symbols and frames of reference and engage in promoting religious institutions. There 
has hardly been any absence of religious scholarship and observance within Egyptian society.
189
  
In many cases, arbitrators of social conflicts and disputes are religious scholars, or popular 
religious figures.
190
 Thinking of Egyptian society along divisions between revivalist piety and 
liberal secularism is therefore, futile and fruitless
191
. Most of the young people in Egypt hold to 
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something of both, with different degrees and at different times.
192
 That religion exists as part 
everyday political, social and economic life means that its modes of reference change according 
to situational needs. The question thus becomes, not about the place of religion as a 
“simple…and homogenized package”193, but about the specificities of the practices of an Islamic 
authority and its intersection with community relations and interest groups. Understanding 
attitudes towards the Muslim Brotherhood is thus telling of the ways in which the values of 
nationalism, national belonging and equality among members of the nation, are re-appropriated 
and understood by local residents, through every day happenings in a neighborhood like ‘Ain el-
Sira.  
I argue that these transformations in attitudes also reveal antagonistic social predispositions 
towards politically and ideologically identifiable nationalist projects. The fact that the Muslim 
Brotherhood as ruling party, identified with an ideologically recognizable mode of rule- that of 
political Islam- had resulted in antagonizing many groups from readily subscribing to their 
project. This is particularly true as the discourse on political Islam had historically been tied with 
national security fears and regional power conspiracies. For instance, one electronic store owner, 
al-hajj Magdy, describes a phase of his life a few years back in which he was multazim, spending 
a lot of his time in the mosque and forming relationships among its regular visitors. However, he 
later became less involved as he learned that National Security Forces were targeting Islamic 
groups, particularly those whose activities take place in private mosques. “Having seen the 
clamp down of the security forces with my own eyes”, explains hajj Magdy, “I decided against 
becoming involved again and kept my visits to the mosque almost only for daily prayers. “It had 
not been until Mohammed Morsi came to power that we understood the dangers of some of the 
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sheikhs and Islamic groups in the area, who turned out to be Ikhwan with specific political gains 
in mind, and not simply do’ah (preachers) talking about religion, which is a central topic in our 
lives.” (Hajj Magdy; 2015). The demonstration of a clearly identifiable ideological project by 
Muslim Brotherhood leaders had created rifts in the kind of religious unity first acclaimed by the 
Islamic group. This kind of aversion to clearly defined ideological projects is consistent with 
Egypt’s historical experiences with previous ideological projects of nationalism, as discussed in 
chapter 2.  The national and territorial registers along which ideological projects were able to 
gain ground and enjoy popular support, such as with Egyptian socialism, were not available to 
the Muslim Brotherhood. The latter, which exists as a force independent from the Egyptian 
Military Institution, and one which has continued to disengage and externalize local social actors 
from its discourse and  project of nationhood.  
Neo-Liberalism and the Creation of Political Civilities 
 
Familiarity with, and recognition of, national authority and leadership in Egypt, is greatly 
intertwined with the national regimes’ adopted modes of governance. For more than a decade 
before its fall, Mubarak’s regime had put forth a neo-liberal mode of economic governance.  The 
neo-liberal restructuring of the market towards more privatization was accompanied by a less 
obvious restructuring of social and political civilities, which are constitutive of the modes of 
interaction among subjects of the nation.
194
 I argue here that the project of neoliberalism in Egypt 
did not cede at a shift in economic policies and foreign investment decisions, but has seeped into 
modes of everyday governance and processes of forming national subjectivities. The rationalities 
of governance and the relations established between residents and representatives of the nation 
and employees of the state, have continued to stem from within a neoliberal rationality of 
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operation
195
. Such a rationality entails a proliferation of individual and personalized spaces for 
profiting and money-making, often operating outside the limits of the law. That is, the ways in 
which neoliberal governmentality has intersected with an over-laden and poorly managed 
government and bureaucracy, led to a rise in the number of incidents in which residents 
improvise means of making and maintaining their livelihoods. An informal economy of 
entrepreneurs and middlemen, has grown to cater to the growing demands of residents of the 
neighborhood, as described in chapter 3. And despite the seemingly receding role of the state in 
providing for its citizens, its presence remains to be felt through the intermediary spaces between 
the law and its selective enforcement. 
196
 As Timothy Mitchell alerts us, the practices of 
neoliberalism do not, in reality, signify a retreat of the state.
197
 But the point would be to 
recognize the kinds of social and political power relations that have managed to flourish within 
the modes of neo-liberal governance. Realizing the spatial strategies and manifestations of 
neoliberalism in everyday life, allows for a clearer understanding of the references along which 
nationalism and acceptance of national authority, can be construed in everyday life in ‘Ain el-
Sira.  
One of the most obvious changes the area witnessed over the past thirty years, is that of residents 
adding new extensions to residential blocks. By the time this research was being conducted, 
almost all buildings had significant additions to them, sometimes adding two or three new rooms 
to apartments. Apartment buildings as such, were seen to extend onto pavements and streets, 
causing the majority of roads in the neighborhood to become much narrower. The wide 
sidewalks that used to run along the sides of all the main streets have become occupied by tens of 
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coffee shops, workshops, small kiosks and other miscellaneous stores, including clothes shops, 
hairdressers, barbers, and mobile phone stores. The physical changes taking place in the 
neighborhood, are very much linked to the proliferation of a culture of privatization in Egypt 
over the past decade.  
More so, the appearance of alternative means of obtaining permits, has allowed for a surge in the 
trend of customizing living quarters in ‘Ain el-Sira. Building extensions and opening businesses 
could initially only take place through obtaining tasareeh (permits) from the municipality and 
would only be afforded to small, specific changes to the area.  However, the growing consumer 
market for construction, meant that residents were continuously engaging with state authorities 
to obtain the necessary permits. Lengthy and uncertain process of obtaining legal permits had led 
to trends in evasion, most of which were made possible by employees of the municipality, who 
could be bribed off. A class of middlemen from within the area congruently emerged, as 
possibilities for material benefits from private constructions unfolded. The middlemen in this 
case are contractors (me’awleen) that take on the complete process of constructing the buildings. 
The contractor becomes responsible for building the extensions, providing man-power and 
resources, as well as securing a legal permit from the municipality.
198
 In order to do so, the 
contractor must have established strong relations with personnel from within the police 
apparatus, as well as with employees from the municipality.
199
 I argue that relations of mutual 
reciprocity, enabled by the multiple foci of power inherent in the modes of neoliberal 
governmentality, has allowed groups of residents to establish relations within the power 
networks of the state. Inclusion within these networks is one of the ways in which residents 
create their own stake in the national polity and imagine their places as citizens. Personal 
                                                          
198
 Interview with Alaa, car workshop owner 
199
 Interview with Alaa  
111 
 
relations as such, centrally figure in residents’ conceptions of national authority and the 
possibilities of their inclusion within it. Fears over the Muslim Brotherhood’s take-over of these 
spaces amid calls by national and public figures to protect the nation from the dangers of 
“ikhwanization” of the state apparatus, have caused many groups in ‘Ain el-Sira to resist the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s rule.   
The case of the contractors is only one of the manifold ways in which residents negotiate spatial 
power with national authorities. Another trend in the neighborhood that provides insight into the 
ways citizens become part of power relations of the nation, is a rather more political one. Some 
of the old and well-known coffee shop owners (ahawy) in the area have been engaged with 
Mubarak’s regime as electoral brokers (samasret intikhabat).200 Al Hagg Yasser, is the son of the 
owner of one of those coffee shops. During parliamentary elections, groups of residents 
performing as middlemen engaged in processes of selling and buying votes for certain NDP 
candidates. The ability to foster spaces of mutual interest between the national authority and 
local middlemen, has awarded the latter political and social weight in the neighborhood while 
simultaneously maintaining the NDP’s power in the electoral district. Fostering these relations of 
mutual benefit and reciprocity, has been central in creating national subjectivities. Engaging with 
Mubarak’s regime in this case, did not entail subscription to its ideological or political stances, 
but is formed on the basis of personal and utilitarian relationships between citizens and bodies of 
the state; a kind of political sociability that did not develop with the members of the Muslim 
Brotherhood. 
I argue that the lack of spaces of engagement with the Muslim Brotherhood have more to tell 
about their positionality in neighborhoods like ‘Ain Al Sira, than macro-view analyses usually 
                                                          
200
 Interview with Omar 
112 
 
show us. Main stream discourse has continuously situated the popularity of the Muslim 
Brotherhood within impoverished sha’bi areas. However, the image presented from ‘Ain el-Sira 
points to a rather different view. It brings to light the historical and local specificities inherent in 
processes of power negotiations between local notables and the national authority. Antagonism 
from the Muslim Brotherhood’s modes of rule is particularly true for the local interest groups 
discussed above, who had secured their positions with the former regime’s tactics of inclusion 
and profitability. Sentiments of ‘externality’ from the interests of the Muslim Brotherhood is 
repetitively echoed in respondents’ words, who describe the Muslim Brotherhood as “traitors” of 
the nation, geared towards securing their own organizations’ interests. Hostility towards their 
rule also tapped into local registers, whereby residents from the neighborhood, classified as 
thugs, convicts and outlaws had become identified as under the political control of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, uncovering a kind of territorial threat that had rendered long-term power relations 
in the locale as unstable and under threat. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored some of the ways in which social relations and recognition of “others” 
in local neighborhoods, have been central to understanding the national resonance of the Muslim 
Brotherhood in the neighborhood of ‘Ain el-Sira. It has also explored the ways in which 
interactions with bodies of the state can be seen as generative spaces for understanding popular 
constructions of the values of national inclusion on the local level. In other words, the chapter 
attempted to demonstrate some of the ways in which experiences of national loyalty and 
inclusion within a nation whose ideological project is incoherent and difficult to define, become 
elaborated on more informal and personal relations between residents and representatives of the 
state. The Brotherhood’s inherent externality from the power relations and interest groups 
113 
 
created in the neighborhood has arguably mobilized many against them. Interestingly so, these 
structural features of informality and personal rule have also been maintained by the Muslim 
Brotherhood, and their presence in the neighborhood was more like pitting systems of patronage 
against one another.
201
 Another critical argument in this chapter is related to popular aversion to 
ideologically limited nationalist projects and how even political groups operating within the 
popular sphere of religion, could become delegitimized, as their respective modes of inclusion 
and equality existed on the conditionality of subscribing to the ideology of the state. All in all, 
this chapter has discussed some of the many ways in which the spheres of religion and Egyptian 
nationalism ought to be read as discursively expressed in relation to one another, with a 
sensitivity to the local practices and events which essentially come to define their limits. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
201
 Menza, 32 
114 
 
Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis has dealt with nationalism and defined it, as a historical and social 
construction as well as a negotiated and experienced power relationship formed between citizens 
and the national elite. Exploring Egyptian nationalism in this work was more specifically focused 
on its positionality in relation to religion, which is often imagined to exist as “external” to 
nationalism. The previous chapters explored some of the ways in which this assumption appears 
limited in capturing the interrelated and interactive spheres of nationalism and Islam within local 
communities in Egypt. Analyses of the Muslim Brotherhood’s experience in Egypt in 2012 
appeared specifically limited by such assumption, as the failure of the Brotherhood’s political 
project was continuously attributed to the group’s abuse of religious and Islamic teachings, in 
contrast to the allegedly more civil- even secular- modes of governance desired by the majority 
of the population. What these simplified arguments miss, are the social and economic forces at 
play in the creation of nationalist loyalties and in constructing the limits of national community; 
those which fall beyond a blunt opposition between religion and nationalism. Therefore, through 
focusing on macro discourses of Egyptian nationalism, chapter two discussed the interplay of 
territorial and ideological forces in creating the conceptual limits of national belonging. The 
discussion made apparent the centrality of the role of the Egyptian military in capturing the 
patriotic energies of the national public, valorizing the unified territorial nation through 
consistently asserting its control over it either through war victories or regional agreements and 
alliances. It was also shown that the popularity of the ruling regime and its ability to create a 
sense of shared identity and inclusiveness among wide scores of the population, preconditioned 
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its ability at furthering a specific political ideology, as was the case with Nasser’s socialism. 
Therefore, instead of viewing the failed project of the Muslim Brotherhood as a negation of the 
use of Islam in national politics, it should rather be viewed as a large consequence of the Muslim 
Brotherhood’s separateness from the patriotic institution of the army and the narrative of 
patriotism that is associated with it. More so, the group’s distinct ideological orientation had 
further destabilized its patriotic image, particularly as it could not lay claim to any grand 
unifying nationalist narratives. Inclusiveness within the national project thus became acutely 
related to an ideological assimilation with the Muslim Brotherhood, rather than through a sense 
of general inclusion and equality as Egyptians.  
Chapter three and four further explored these contentions through the daily experiences of 
residents of ‘Ain el Sira, particularly through their interactions with personnel and bodies of the 
state. Again, instead of viewing residents’ experiences and choices as falling along the binaries 
of religious and national loyalty, they were rather seen according to the modes and extents to 
which residents imagined their inclusiveness within the national project and the shared stakes 
they imagined to exist with the ruling regime. This work has argued that this struggle for 
inclusion is played out through daily interactions with bodies and representatives of the state. 
Through focusing on local power groups in the neighborhood and the kinds of relations they 
have fostered and maintained with different state bodies and personnel, it becomes possible to 
view those relations as generative sites for negotiating and experiencing the modes of inclusion, 
equality and belonging within the nation and the national project.   
The two chapters focused on the social roles of large families in the neighborhood as well as 
owners of local businesses and those engaged in other forms of profiteering. Those included 
coffee shop owners, car workshop owners and local building contractors. It was shown how 
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those groups and individuals had managed to foster informal and personalized relationships with 
a number of state personnel and bodies in the neighborhood. Those which included local police 
and investigation officers, municipality workers and former NDP members and candidates. 
Residents’ engagement in these mutually beneficial relations with state personnel, stemmed from 
the opportunities such relations offer. Those included increased spaces for residents to maintain 
control over their modes of social and economic organization, as well an increased chances for 
profiteering and money-making. The cases included business owners’ functioning as electoral 
brokers for former NDP candidates. Included also are local contractors who have established 
strong relations within the local municipality and with local police officers. The development of 
these relations made possible a capacity for recognizing shared stakes between residents and 
state power groups and networks of interest. A mode of socio-political organization which was 
absent from the Muslim Brotherhood’s positioning in the neighborhood.  
Focusing on the kinds of power relations and networks of interest between residents and 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood, it is possible to see the lack of spaces of familiarity and 
mutual recognition between the two. First of all, many residents expressed not having known 
about the Islamic organization and its ideological project prior to the January 25 revolution. 
Islamic associations affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood such as the JS have continued to 
operate in the neighborhood although without being identified by the residents as politically 
affiliated with the Islamic group. More so, incidents like controlling the state-owned bakery and 
the butane gas cylinder warehouse, offering members of the Muslim Brotherhood advantageous 
access to their resources, had allowed a discourse of difference and “othering” to take over, 
causing the Brotherhood to be seen as an outside and unfamiliar power group. Residents’ 
sentiments of separation from the project of the Brotherhood also appeared quite clearly in the 
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incident of the take-over of al Geel center. The move to “retrieve” the center demonstrates a 
moment where the values of community relations and the power of local networks, were set 
against the apparently distinct power networks inherent in the Brotherhood’s organization. All in 
all, it appears that the political, economic and social modes of organization in the neighborhood 
had allowed for an understanding of the Muslim Brotherhood as outside the realm of a nationally 
inclusive leadership. The struggle for inclusion and recognition, thus appeared distinctively 
arduous under their rule, sidestepping their claim of pious and equal rule.  
Finally, this research has engaged with the works of historians and anthropologists such as Ziad 
Fahmy, Asef Bayat and Salwa Ismail, whose work is considered an important shift towards 
alternative understandings of historical and popular politics of national transformation. Focusing 
on “regular” citizens, the “non-movements” in everyday modern cities, this research has aimed 
to build upon their micro-view focus on the differentiated realms of social and political 
organization inherent in the regularities of everyday life of modern citizenry. Important also, is 
the force of the neo-liberal city, as a commercializing and individualizing mode of social and 
economic engagement which has been part of the discursive processes of the formation of modes 
of power-sharing and inclusion within the modern nationalist project.  
This thesis has argued for an understanding of every day social, economic and political processes 
as spaces through which religion and national belonging appear as over-lapping discourses. The 
results are socially negotiated, popular understandings of national belonging negotiated on 
differentiated planes of individual interest, community histories, and modes of familiarity and 
trust. I argue that these understandings place Egyptian nationalism as one which is inherently 
pious and religious, yet that which continues to base its legitimacy in the modes of national 
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inclusion and the imagined spaces for power-sharing among power groups of the national 
regime.  
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